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This dissertation includes two chapters on international joint ventures and corporate 
finance. 
 
Chapter 1 is the first to relate the hubris hypothesis (Roll, 1986) to international joint 
ventures. I investigate shareholder wealth effects of US-China joint venture 
announcements from 1985 to 2007, utilizing the SDC database. The results show that, 
on average, investing in China through joint ventures is a wealth-creating activity for 
US shareholders. However, there is considerable cross-sectional disparity in wealth 
effects. The worst joint ventures are made by firms with the best recent performance, 
which suggests that managerial hubris drives bad joint venture investments and 
damages shareholders’ wealth. There is no evidence that agency problems lower 
shareholder announcement returns significantly. Trading around announcements is 
consistent with the hubris explanation. The results also suggest that an independent 
and vigilant board may resist the detrimental effects of managerial hubris. 
 
Chapter 2 investigates the shareholder value of 1042 international joint venture 
announcements made by US firms from 1999-2008. In general, shareholders of US 
partners announcing IJV investments in foreign countries realize positive and 
significant abnormal returns. Further analysis shows that IJVs invested outside of the 
 core businesses of both US and foreign partners and formed by partners with different 
core businesses are most value-increasing for US shareholders. Results suggest that 
industrial diversification through IJV investments increases shareholder value of US 
partners, and partner business unrelatedness enhances value creation from 
diversification. The diversification premium found in this paper also suggests that the 
international joint venture may be a preferred mode over international acquisition and 
Greenfield FDI when US firms engage in foreign direct investments outside of their 
core businesses. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
MANAGERIAL HUBRIS AND INTERNATIONAL JOINT VENTURES: 
EVIDENCE FROM U.S.-CHINA JV ANNOUNCEMENTS 
 
1.1 Introduction 
This paper provides the first study to relate managerial hubris1 to international 
joint venture investments. The idea for this paper is motivated by two separate areas of 
the literature. One is the irrational manager approach in behavioral corporate finance, 
or, more specifically, managerial hubris or overconfidence. The other is the work on 
shareholder wealth effects of international joint ventures in international finance. 
Debont and Thaler (1995) point out that “perhaps the most robust finding in 
the psychology of judgment is that people are overconfident.” Goel and Thakor (2008) 
find that overconfident managers are more likely to be promoted to CEO, and imply 
that overconfidence is more prevalent among CEOs than in the general population. 
Roll (1986) pioneers the irrational manager approach in the corporate finance 
literature, advancing a “hubris” theory as an explanation of corporate takeovers. 
Managers in acquiring firms pay too much for targets because they overvalue the 
target and gains from the corporate combination, which causes losses to bidding firm 
shareholders. Roll concludes that “the evidence supports the hubris hypothesis as 
much as it supports other explanations”. 
 Roll’s hubris theory echoes a vivid description made by Warren Buffet: “Many 
managements apparently were overexposed in impressionable childhood years to the 
                                                 
1
 The terminologies of managerial hubris, managerial overconfidence, and managerial overoptimism are 
interchangeable in the literature. In this paper, I define managerial hubris as managers “overstat[ing] the 
increase in economic value” (Roll, 1986) of their international joint ventures or overconfident CEOs 
“overestimat[ing] the return to their” international joint venture “investment projects” (Malmendier and 
Tate, 2005). 
2 
story in which the imprisoned handsome prince is released from a toad’s body by a 
kiss from a beautiful princess. Consequently, they are certain their managerial kiss 
will do wonders for the profitability of Company T(arget). Such optimism is 
essential…many managerial princesses remain serenely confident about the future 
potency of their kisses - even after their corporate backyards are knee-deep in 
unresponsive toads”.2 
International joint ventures are important and common tools employed by 
firms in investing abroad.3 Many studies have explored the shareholder wealth effects 
of international joint ventures, but results in terms of value creation are mixed. The 
source of inefficient joint ventures is unclear. 
Although the hubris hypothesis is proposed by Roll for domestic corporate 
takeovers, valuation errors caused by managerial hubris are likely to occur in other 
corporate investments, as well. Malmendier and Tate (2005) show that CEO 
overconfidence causes corporate investment distortions. In the context of cross-border 
investments, Seth, Song, and Pettit (2000) find evidence which is consistent with the 
hubris hypothesis for foreign acquisitions of U.S. firms. Therefore, managerial hubris 
may be relevant in the context of cross-border joint venture investments. Managers 
with hubris may over invest in some unprofitable international joint ventures at the 
expense of shareholders’ wealth because they mistakenly overestimate returns from 
those joint ventures.4  
Stock market reactions to joint venture announcements provide a direct 
measure of shareholder wealth. My initial sample includes all US-China joint venture 
                                                 
2
 http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/1981.html 
3
 Beside joint ventures, other two modes of foreign direct investment are acquisitions and wholly owned 
greenfield investments. 
4
 Managerial hubris explanation is different from the agency problems explanation. Overconfident 
managers are loyal to shareholders although their inadvertent bad investments actually harm 
shareholders. Agency problems explanation states that mangers will make bad investments for their 
personal benefit, without regard for shareholders’ wealth.    
3 
announcements before the end of 2007 in the SDC platinum. There are three reasons 
to focus my sample of international joint ventures on US-China joint ventures located 
in China. First, the existing literature has shown that shareholder wealth effects of 
international joint ventures are related to characteristics of the countries of partners 
and the location of joint ventures. Focusing on a pair of specific partner countries and 
a specific destination country has advantages in terms of clearly revealing firm level 
determinants. Second, China is ranked the most favored destination for foreign direct 
investment.5  According to the Economist, “It seems that every multinational in the 
world is either in China already or declaring that it cannot afford not to be.”6 
Therefore, it is more likely that firms overestimate potential returns from their joint 
venture investment projects in China. Third, the United States maintains its position as 
the largest single source country of foreign direct investment7, and the availability of 
data for US firms also make my empirical analysis feasible. 
In this paper, I try to answer the following questions: Does the managerial 
hubris of US partners drive inefficient international joint venture investments and 
damage shareholder returns? Does the alternative and rational agency problem drive 
bad international joint venture investments? What can firms do to resist managerial 
hubris? 
The main findings of this paper are: (1) Abnormal returns of US partners 
around joint venture announcements are positive on average, and negatively related to 
the managerial hubris indicator. Shareholders of high hubris US firms significantly 
lose, while shareholders of low hubris US firms significantly gain upon joint venture 
announcements. (2) Agency problems do not affect announcement shareholder returns 
                                                 
5
 The Economist, Jan 20th 2005. This ranking is according to an annual survey “FDI confidence index”, 
which is based on an annual survey of CEOs, CFOs, and other top executives of Global 1000 
companies, conducted by A.T. Kearney. 
6
 The Economist, Mar 18th 2004. 
7
 World Investment Report 2008, UNCTAD. 
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of US partners significantly. (3) The negative relationship between the hubris indicator 
and abnormal returns is strengthened when the board chair and CEO positions are held 
by the same person. (4) Announcement trading volume for high hubris US firms is 
abnormally high. 
The contribution of this paper lies in the following: First, it combines the 
literature from three subfields of finance – behavioral finance, corporate finance and 
international finance. Second, this is the first paper that uses well-known hubris theory 
to study investment efficiency of international joint ventures. Third, this is also the 
first paper that comprehensively tests the effect of agency problems on shareholder 
wealth effects of international joint ventures.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 1.2 reviews related 
literature. Section 1.3 describes the sample. Wealth effects of US-China joint ventures 
are presented in Section 1.4. Section 1.5 discusses the cross-sectional analysis of 
wealth effects. Section 1.6 provides further evidence of managerial hubris. Section 1.7 
summarizes and concludes the paper. 
 
1.2 Literature review 
1.2.1 Managerial hubris (overconfidence) and corporate investments 
 Roll (1986) introduces the irrational manager approach to the study of 
corporate investments with his hubris theory of corporate takeovers, suggesting that at 
least part of the takeover premium is caused by the overvaluation error of bidders. 
Decision makers in acquiring firms are affected by hubris and pay too much for 
targets. Hubris theory predicts the value of the bidding firm decreases on 
announcement of a bid.  
 Hayward and Hambrick (1997) examine the role of CEO hubris in a sample of 
106 large acquisitions in 1989 and 1992.  They construct a hubris factor from three 
5 
hubris indicators: recent acquirer performance, media praise for the CEO, and CEO 
relative compensation. They find that the hubris factor is positively associated with 
acquisition premium and negatively associated with one-year post acquisition 
shareholder returns, but they don’t find that hubris has an effect on immediate 
shareholder returns. 
 Malmendier and Tate (2005a) regress investment on cash flow, the CEO 
overconfidence measure, and the interaction term of cash flow and overconfidence 
measure, using the timing of option exercises and habitual acquisition of stock to 
measure CEO overconfidence. They find that the investment of overconfident CEOs is 
more sensitive to cash flow than the investment of CEOs who are not overconfident 
and interpret this heightened sensitivity as: overconfident CEOs overestimating returns 
from their investment, and over investing relative to the first-best when there is 
sufficient cash flow. They conclude that managerial overconfidence leads to 
distortions in corporate investment. Malmendier and Tate (2005b) replicate the same 
regression used in Malmendier and Tate (2005a) using CEOs’ press portrayals as a 
CEO overconfidence measure, and find consistent results. Malmendier and Tate 
(2008) study the overconfidence of a sample of FORBES 500 CEOs and their merger 
decisions. Using two proxies of CEO overconfidence: executive option exercise delay 
and press portrayal, they find that overconfident CEOs are more likely to make 
acquisitions. They also find that the market reaction at merger announcements is more 
negative for firms with overconfident CEOs.  
 
1.2.2 Shareholder wealth effects of joint ventures for US partners 
McConnell and Nantell (1985) provide the first study to use stock market data 
to investigate questions regarding joint ventures. Based on a sample of 210 firms 
involved in 136 US domestic joint ventures from 1972 to 1979, they find a significant 
6 
two-day average abnormal return of 0.73%, and an average increase of about 5 million 
in dollar values. The smaller partner earns a larger abnormal return than the larger 
partner while the dollar gains are more equally divided. These wealth gains scaled by 
amounts invested are similar to those documented in mergers. Given the similarity in 
results of their paper on joint ventures and various studies of mergers, they suggest 
that their results are supportive of the synergy effect as the source of gains from 
corporation combinations. However, they don’t analyze fundamental economic factors 
that generate the wealth gains. 
Many studies investigate wealth effects of international joint ventures for US 
shareholders, but they present mixed results.  
Some studies (e.g., Lummer and McConnell, 1990; Ueng, Kim, and Lee, 2000) 
find significantly positive abnormal returns for US firms announcing international 
joint ventures. Lummer and McConnell (1990) examine joint ventures of US firms 
with foreign firms and foreign governments during 1971 to 1980. They show that 
international joint ventures are value-creating investments for shareholders of US 
partners. The average announcement period return for their sample is 0.40% with a t-
statistics of 2.42. Value increases with the size of the investment. Joint ventures with 
foreign firms create more value than joint ventures with foreign governments. The 
study provides no evidence that the increases in value are the result of diversification 
benefits. There is also no evidence that joint ventures in less developed countries are 
particularly valuable for shareholders of US partners. Ueng, Kim, and Lee (2000) 
provide evidence that international joint ventures are value-increasing activities for 
shareholders of US multinational firms. Their results show that higher returns are 
associated with IJVs with developed countries than with developing countries. They 
also show that stock markets react more favorably to IJV announcements when US 
firms possess a higher degree of ownership advantages.  
7 
Some papers (e.g., Finnerty et al., 1986; Gupta and Misra, 2000) show that 
market response to the announcements of international joint ventures is insignificant. 
Finnerty et al. (1986) analyze 208 US domestic and international joint ventures, and 
find no significant abnormal returns around joint ventures formation. They indicate 
that the wealth effect for shareholders of US partners is similar to acquirers in mergers 
and tender offers. Gupta and Misra (2000) analyze 532 international joint venture 
announcements between one US firm and one or more foreign firms from 1979 to 
1992. They find that the two-day announcement-period CAR is 0.057% and not 
statistically significant. The numbers of positive and negative reactions in the sample 
are roughly equal.  
Some papers (e.g., Lee and Wyatt, 1990; Chung, Koford, and Lee, 1993) find 
wealth losses from announcements of foreign joint ventures for shareholders of US 
firms. Lee and Wyatt (1990) report that the abnormal return on the announcement date 
is -0.466% and significant, the cumulative abnormal return from day -5 to day +5 is 
about -1.38%, and also significant. Their results show that only joint ventures with 
firms from lesser developed countries have nonnegative effects on shareholders’ 
wealth, and suggest that one explanation of their results may be provided by Jensen’s 
agency cost of free cash flow. Firms may over invest in foreign joint ventures that 
increase managers’ control at the expense of shareholders’ wealth. However, they 
don’t empirically test their argument. Chung, Koford and Lee (1993) investigate 164 
US firms from 1969 to 1988, and show that the value of US firms making 
international joint ventures falls by 2.79% during the 90-day period surrounding the 
announcement date.  
Several papers focus on US investment in China and study the shareholder 
wealth effects of US-China joint ventures. Chen, Hu, and Shieh (1991) offer the first 
study on the shareholder wealth effects of US investment in China through 
8 
international joint ventures. For a sample of 88 US-China joint venture 
announcements during the 1979-1990 period, they find that the US stock market reacts 
positively to announcements and the abnormal return on the announcement date is 
0.52%. Their results suggest that establishing joint ventures in China creates positive 
wealth gains for shareholders because the multinational firm benefits from 
establishing a global network. In addition, they find that the positive wealth effect is 
negatively related to the size of the foreign investment, but that variables such as the 
number of foreign subsidiaries, prior presence in the Far East market and the size of 
parent firms can not explain the announcement effect. They suggest that firms should 
“actively explore opportunities in China through joint ventures, while at the same time 
they should be prudent and start small”. 
Hu, Chen, and Shieh (1992), in a study of US-China joint ventures, find that 
US investors’ response to joint venture announcements is associated with the degree 
of international involvement of US companies. US companies with low international 
involvement experience positive abnormal returns when joint venture announcements 
are made. Firms with high international involvement receive no significant positive or 
negative stock re-evaluation. 
Gupta et al. (1991) show that joint venture equity investment in China is a 
value enhancing activity for US multinational corporations. Results from cross-
sectional regressions show that investing in equity joint ventures in China is more 
valuable for firms that have a relatively small market share, a relatively low level of 
capital intensity and a greater level of technological intensity.    
Cheng, Fung, and Lam (1998) study a sample of 103 US-China joint ventures 
during the 1979-1993 period and find a significant 3-day abnormal return of 1.02%. 
To explain abnormal returns, they examine eight variables including four financial 
ratios (current ratio, debt ratio, total assets turnover, ROE), industry classification, 
9 
prior experience in China, location of headquarters and time trend. The sub-sample 
and regression analysis shows that none of the factors examined affect the size of the 
abnormal returns during the joint ventures announcements. The paper suggests that 
further research is needed to understand the determinants of stock price effects of US-
China joint venture announcements. 
Mittoo and Chung (2002) analyze the wealth effect of joint venture 
investments in China for firms from the US and Hong Kong in the 1989-1995 period. 
They report that Chinese joint ventures are value-enhancing for shareholders of US 
firms. These wealth gains are positively related to the previous business experience of 
US partners in China, and negatively related to firm size of US partners. Presence in 
Southeast Asia and high technology ventures has a negative impact on wealth gains 
for US firms. 
 
1.3 Sample selection and description 
I obtain my sample of US-China joint venture announcements from the 
Thomson Financial SDC platinum joint ventures database. This database includes 
worldwide joint ventures information from sources such as the US Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) filings and their international counterparts, trade 
publications, wires and news sources. I focus on joint ventures which are located in 
China and involve only one US partner and one Chinese partner. All US-China joint 
venture announcements before the end of 2007 in this database are included in my 
sample. To analyze stock market responses to announcements, US partners must list 
common stocks on the New York or American Stock Exchange and have daily stock 
price information available from the Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP). 
My final sample yields 388 joint venture announcements.  
10 
Table 1.1 shows the sample distribution by calendar year. The largest number 
of US-China joint venture announcements in one year is 60 (15.5%) in 1994, followed 
by 55 (14.2%) in 1995. This is consistent with the general pattern of inward foreign 
direct investment in China.8  
 
Table 1.1: Sample distribution by year of US-China joint venture announcements 
 
Year 
Number of 
announcements 
Percent of 
sample 
1985 1 0.3 
1986 0 0.0 
1987 2 0.5 
1988 1 0.3 
1989 1 0.3 
1990 4 1.0 
1991 9 2.3 
1992 13 3.4 
1993 25 6.4 
1994 60 15.5 
1995 55 14.2 
1996 31 8.0 
1997 24 6.2 
1998 22 5.7 
1999 15 3.9 
2000 16 4.1 
2001 13 3.4 
2002 19 4.9 
2003 10 2.6 
2004 12 3.1 
2005 18 4.6 
2006 17 4.4 
2007 20 5.2 
Total 388 100.0 
 
                                                 
8
 According to the EIU country data, the ratio of inward foreign direct investment over gross fixed 
investment in China is 16.8% in 1994 and 14.3% in 1995, ranking first and second during my sample 
period from 1985 to 2007. 
11 
Table 1.2 presents the distribution of joint ventures for sample firms and 
representative firms. The percentage of US firms with multiple announcements is 
about 30%. The most active US partners in the sample are Dupont, GM, 
Westinghouse, IBM, and Motorola.  
 
Table 1.2: Sample distribution by frequency 
 
Illustrative partners with the joint venture 
announcement date Number of 
announcem
ents per US 
partner 
Number 
of US 
firms 
US partner Chinese partner announcement date 
13 1 EI du Pont 
de Nemours 
& Co 
China National 
Textile Machinery 
05/11/94 
10 1 General 
Motors Corp 
Zhejiang Asia-
Pacific Machine 
& Electric Group 
02/14/96 
 
9 2 Westinghous
e Electric 
Corp 
Shanghai Electric 
Equipment Corp 
06/18/96 
 
7 1 International 
Business 
Machines 
Corp 
China Great Wall 
Computer Group 
Co Ltd 
08/31/99 
 
6 3 Motorola Inc Huawei 
Technologies Co 
Ltd 
07/25/06 
 
5 4 American 
Telephone & 
Telegraph 
Co 
Shanghai 
Telecommunicati
ons Equipment 
Factory 
03/31/93 
 
4 8 Compaq 
Computer 
Corp 
Beijing Founder 
Electronics Corp 
Ltd 
12/15/98 
 
3 18 Aluminum 
Co of 
America 
Shanghai 
Aluminum 
Fabrication Plant 
05/12/95 
 
2 28 Procter & 
Gamble Co 
Tianjin Toilet 
Soap Factory 
11/23/93 
1 160 International 
Paper Co 
Shandong Sun 
Paper Industry 
Joint Stock Co 
Ltd 
08/30/05 
 
12 
Table 1.3 reports the distribution of joint ventures by industry. Joint ventures 
are widely spread across 44 different industries. The largest group of joint ventures is 
formed in Chemicals and Allied Products (13.12%), followed by Transportation 
Equipment (12.60%), Business Services (6.30%) and Machinery (6.04%). 
 
1.4 Wealth effects of US-China joint venture announcements  
1.4.1 Methodology 
 I use standard event-study methods to investigate the effects of US-China joint 
venture announcements on the returns to the US firms’ shareholders. Researchers have 
used this technique widely to examine shareholders’ wealth effects associated with 
joint venture announcements. Abnormal returns created by joint venture 
announcements represent the changed economic value or wealth for shareholders from 
joint venture investments. Abnormal returns also reflect investors’ assessment of 
future performance or value of joint ventures. Following Brown and Warner (1985), I 
use a market model in my event study. The announcement date from the SDC database 
is defined as day 0. Trading days prior to the announcement day are numbered event 
days -1, -2, and so on. Trading days after the announcement day are numbered event  
days +1, +2, and so on. For each firm, market model coefficients are estimated using 
daily returns and CRSP equally weighted market returns over the 150-day estimation 
period from day -170 to day -21. The coefficients estimated are used to compute the 
daily abnormal returns for the event period (days -10 to +10). Abnormal returns for all 
firms in each day are averaged to get average abnormal returns. Cumulative average 
abnormal returns are obtained by summing the average abnormal returns over various 
intervals. The values of abnormal returns (AR) and cumulative abnormal returns 
(CAR) are tested for a statistically significant difference from zero using the two-tail 
parametric Patell Z test. The nonparametric test is normally used to verify that results  
13 
Table 1.3: Sample distribution by industry of joint ventures 
Industry 
 
Frequency 
 
Percent 
 
Advertising Services 2 0.52 
Aerospace and Aircraft 1 0.26 
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing   1 0.26 
Air Transportation and Shipping   4   1.05 
Business Services    24   6.30 
Chemicals and Allied Products    50 13.12 
Commercial Banks, Bank Holding Companies    1   0.26 
Communications Equipment 11   2.89 
Computer and Office Equipment    10   2.62 
Construction Firms                                                4 1.05 
Credit Institutions 1 0.26 
Drugs      12 3.15 
Educational Services          1   0.26 
Electric, Gas, and Water Distribution 8   2.10 
Electronic and Electrical Equipment    19    4.99 
Food and Kindred Products   16 4.20 
Hotels and Casinos    2   0.52 
Insurance            5    1.31 
Investment & Commodity Firms, Dealers, Exchanges    10 2.62 
Machinery    23   6.04 
Measuring, Medical, Photo Equipment; Clocks   10   2.62 
Metal and Metal Products 19 4.99 
Mining 2 0.52 
Miscellaneous Manufacturing 1 0.26 
Oil and Gas; Petroleum Refining 9 2.36 
Paper and Allied Products 4 1.05 
Prepackaged Software 8 2.10 
Printing, Publishing, and Allied Services 2 0.52 
Real Estate; Mortgage Bankers and Brokers 1 0.26 
Retail Trade-Eating and Drinking Places 3 0.79 
Retail Trade-General Merchandise and Apparel 1 0.26 
Rubber and Miscellaneous Plastic Products 7 1.84 
Sanitary Services 3 0.79 
Soaps, Cosmetics, and Personal-Care Products 7 1.84 
Social Services 1 0.26 
Stone, Clay, Glass, and Concrete Products 10 2.62 
Telecommunications 7 1.84 
Textile and Apparel Products 9 2.36 
Tobacco Products 1 0.26 
Transportation Equipment 48 12.60 
Transportation and Shipping (except air) 10 2.62 
Wholesale Trade-Durable Goods 10 2.62 
Wholesale Trade-Nondurable Goods 2 0.52 
Wood Products, Furniture, and Fixtures 1 0.26 
14 
from parametric tests are not driven by outliers. I use a nonparametric rank test 
described in Corrado (1989) to test the significance of the rank of the abnormal return. 
I also use the nonparametric generalized sign test to test whether the fraction of 
positive returns is different from that in the estimation period. 
 
1.4.2 Event study results 
 The event study results in the Table 1.4 indicate that, on average, US 
shareholders benefit from the announcement of their firms’ joint ventures in China for 
my sample. The AR on day 0 is 0.32%, the largest one-day abnormal return over the 
entire 21-day event period. This is statistically significant at the 5% level according to 
the parametric test, but not significant according to the nonparametric test. The two-
day [0, +1] CAR is 0.53%, which is also significantly different from zero according to 
the parametric test. These abnormal returns found for my sample are similar to those 
documented in Chen, Hu, and Shieh (1991) for their US-China joint ventures sample 
between 1979 and 1990. Following McConnell and Nantell (1985), I also convert the 
abnormal return to a dollar value. For each announcement, [0, +1] abnormal return is 
multiplied by the firm’s market value of equity. The cross-sectional mean of dollar 
values is about $31 million.9 The fraction of stocks with positive CAR for the [0, +2] 
interval is 53.8% and significant. However, the results show that only in slightly more 
than half of the joint ventures did shareholders earn positive abnormal returns. There 
are quite a number of US partners experiencing negative abnormal returns on each day 
in the event period [-10, +10]. In the next section, I try to explain this considerable 
cross-sectional variation and investigate whether the hubris of US firms drives bad 
                                                 
9
 This average dollar value is much larger than the $4.8 million reported by McConnell and Nantell 
(1985) for US domestic joint ventures. It is similar to the dollar gain for US shareholders of $30.7 
million reported by Crutchley, Guo, and Hansen (1991) for US-Japanese joint ventures. 
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international joint venture investments and damages shareholder announcement 
returns. 
 
Table 1.4: Abnormal returns of US partners for US-China joint venture 
announcements, 1985-2007 
Abnormal returns (AR) and cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) are generated using 
the market model. For each firm, market model coefficients are estimated using daily 
returns and CRSP equally weighted market returns over the 150-day ([-170, -21]) 
estimation period. AR and CAR are tested for a statistically significant difference from 
zero using the two-tail parametric Patell Z test. A nonparametric rank test described in 
Corrado (1989) is used for testing the significance of the rank of the abnormal return. 
The nonparametric generalized sign test is used to test whether the fraction of positive 
returns is different form that in the estimation period. ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Event day or 
window 
AR or 
CAR 
(%) 
Z statistic Rank 
statistic 
Percent 
positive of 
AR or CAR 
-10 0.20 1.613 1.290 51.3 
-9 0.15 1.453 0.310   46.7 
-8 0.05 0.492 0.190   47.9 
-7 -0.05 -1.132 -1.040 45.6 
-6 -0.02 0.782 -0.210    46.7 
-5 -0.11 -1.110 -1.350      45.3 
-4 0.08 0.774 1.160      50.1 
-3 -0.08 -0.468 0.000      49.0 
-2 0.02 0.582 0.620      47.9 
-1 -0.01 -0.367 -0.490      46.7 
0 0.32 2.055** 1.360      48.7 
+1  0.21 0.792 0.300      47.6 
+2 -0.23 -0.799 -0.250      49.9 
+3 -0.03 -0.161 -0.220      48.1 
+4 0.04 0.802 -0.130      45.6 
+5 -0.15 -0.411 -0.840      45.6 
+6 0.08 0.082 -0.410      47.0 
+7 -0.26 -1.555 -1.410      44.2 
+8 -0.17 -1.342 -1.610      42.7* 
+9 0.15 1.084 0.650      49.0 
+10 -0.08 -0.445 -0.300    47.7 
[0, +1] 0.53 2.013** 1.173 51.0 
[0, +2] 0.30 1.182 0.815      53.8** 
[-2, +3] 0.29 0.858    0.542      52.7* 
[-5, +5] 0.07 0.510 0.055      49.0 
[-10, -8] 0.41 2.054** 1.034    50.7 
[-10, +10] 0.12 0.594 -0.513      51.0 
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1.5. Explanations of cross-sectional differences in wealth effects  
1.5.1 Cross-sectional analysis 
The cross-sectional analysis will help us to understand why positive abnormal 
returns are associated with some US-China joint venture announcements and not the 
others, whether managerial hubris significantly lowers abnormal returns, and whether 
agency problems significantly lower abnormal returns. The dependent variable is 
abnormal return of US partners upon joint venture announcements. I focus on two 
categories of explanatory variables that are expected to have an impact on US 
shareholders’ value: US partners’ characteristics and corporate governance variables. 
Characteristics variables include firm size, Tobin’s q, leverage, free cash flow, and 
recent performance. These are variables that are usually associated with managerial 
hubris or agency problems. Firm size, Tobin’s q, and leverage are also used as control 
variables in many studies. The key explanatory variable is the hubris indicator (recent 
performance). Corporate governance variables include an external governance variable 
on antitakeover provisions (the G-index developed by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick 
(2003)), and three internal governance variables (institutional ownership, insider 
ownership, combined CEO-chair). These 4 governance variables are also related to 
hubris or agency explanation. All explanatory variables are discussed in more detail 
below.  
 
US partners characteristics 
Recent performance (RECENTPERFORM) 
This is the key variable in the analysis. According to Roll (1986), “One would 
expect a higher level of hubris in firms that had experienced recent good times.” The 
managerial hubris hypothesis of Roll implies a negative relation between observed 
abnormal returns from international joint venture announcements and recent 
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performance of US partners. The hubris hypothesis predicts that bad international joint 
venture investments are made by recent well performing firms, since their managers 
are most likely to be infected by hubris (Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1990; Hayward 
and Hambrick, 1997). Chung, Koford, and Lee (1993) suggest that managerial hubris 
is a possible explanation for negative wealth effects of US international joint venture 
announcements, but do not carry out any analysis to test the hubris hypothesis.  
In contrast, Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990) find that announcement period 
bidder returns are lower when the bidder performs poorly before the acquisition. They 
suggest that bad acquisitions (or any other investments) are driven by bad managers 
who pursue personal objectives rather than maximization of shareholder wealth, and 
that bad acquisition is a reflection of agency problems in bidding firms. They argue 
that their results are inconsistent with Roll’s hubris hypothesis. So, the agency 
explanation predicts a positive relation between abnormal returns at international joint 
venture announcements and recent performance of US partners.  
Following Hayward and Hambrick (1997) and Lin et al. (2008), I use 12-
month cumulative abnormal return above the equally weighted index prior to day -11 
as a measure of US firms’ recent performance and a proxy for hubris. Data is obtained 
from CRSP. 
 
Free cash flow (FCF) 
 Both hubris and agency theories predict a negative effect of free cash flow on 
abnormal returns, but the arguments behind them are different. The agency costs of 
free cash flow theory (Jensen, 1986) says that managers of firms with large free cash 
flows (cash flow above the level needed to fund current positive NPV projects) are 
more likely to undertake a “low-benefit or even value-destroying” investment instead 
of paying cash out to shareholders, since payouts to shareholders reduce managers’ 
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power. This implies that managers of firms with large free cash flow are more likely to 
over invest in unprofitable foreign joint ventures at the expense of shareholders’ value 
(Lee and Wyatt, 1990). Mohanram and Nanda (1998) find that the stock market reacts 
unfavorably to joint venture announcements by firms that have high levels of free cash 
flow. However, Chen et al. (2000) find that the firm’s level of free cash flow cannot 
explain the cross-sectional variations in wealth effects of international joint ventures. 
They suggest that the free cash flow hypothesis may apply to inter-corporate 
acquisitions, but not to strategic investments such as joint venture investments. 
Another possible explanation suggested in their paper is that their sample firms have 
better investment opportunities and, therefore, that the agency problems of free cash 
flow are not so severe. This explanation is consistent with the finding in Lang, Stulz, 
and Walking (1991) that bidder returns are significantly negatively related to free cash 
flow of firms with poor investment opportunities, but unrelated to the free cash flow of 
firms with good investment opportunities. 
This negative effect is also consistent with the managerial hubris explanation. 
When overconfident managers don’t have sufficient cash flow, they curb their 
investment. They are reluctant to issue more shares to fund their projects because they 
think that the market unfairly undervalues the stock of their company. Overconfident 
managers with a lot of free cash flow are more likely to over invest in lower-quality 
projects because they overestimate the return to their investment projects (Malmendier 
and Tate, 2005). 
 Following Masulis, Wang and Xie (2007), free cash flow is measured as 
operating income before depreciation minus interest expenses minus income taxes 
minus capital expenditures, and then scaled by book value of total assets. Data is 
collected from Compustat for the year preceding joint venture announcements. 
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Tobin’s q (TOBINQ) 
I use Tobin’s q as a measure for investment opportunities as in Lang, Stulz, 
and Walking (1991). The literature has shown that investment opportunity is an 
important factor in explaining the shareholder wealth effect of various domestic and 
international corporate investments. Doukas (1995) finds that the US bidder abnormal 
returns in response to foreign acquisition investment announcements are larger for 
high q firms than low q firms. Chen et al. (2000) find that Singapore firms with 
favorable investment opportunities have significantly positive response to 
international joint venture announcements, and their investments are generally 
worthwhile, whereas firms with poor investment opportunities have negative response 
and their investments may be wasteful.  
I estimate q as the ratio of market value of assets divided by book value of 
assets,10 where the market value of assets is book value of assets minus book value of 
equity plus market value of equity. I collect data for the year prior to announcements 
from Compustat. 
 
Leverage (LEVERAGE) 
Maloney, McCormick, and Mitchell (1993) find that there is a positive relation 
between announcement-period acquirers’ return and their preannouncement leverage. 
They support the idea that debt works to control agency problems between managers 
and stockholders and improves managerial decision making. So, the agency 
explanation predicts that the effect of leverage on announcement abnormal returns of 
joint ventures is positive. 
                                                 
10
 In the corporate finance literature, the market-to-book asset ratio is often used as a proxy for Tobin’s 
q (e.g., Bris and Cabolis, 2008; Masulis, Wang and Xie, 2007; Moelle, Schlingemann, and Stulz, 2004).   
20 
Leverage is measured as long-term debt over book value of asset. I obtain data 
for the year prior to announcements from Compustat. 
 
Firm size (FIRMSIZE) 
Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004) document a negative relation 
between firm size and gains from acquisitions. They find that the abnormal return 
associated with acquisition announcements for small acquirers is higher than that from 
large acquirers and suggest that evidence is consistent with managerial hubris playing 
more of a role in large firms’ decisions. Therefore, the hubris explanation predicts a 
negative relation between abnormal returns at joint venture announcements and firm 
size. Mittoo and Chung (2002) also find that smaller US firms earn larger abnormal 
returns around the announcements of their Chinese joint ventures. 
In contrast, Chen, Hu, and Shieh (1991) suggest that a US multinational’s 
excess value is positively related to its size because large firms have the ability to 
explore long-term advantages and absorb start-up costs in China. Larger firms have 
better bargaining power when they invest in China and are expected to be more 
profitable than smaller firms (Gleason et al., 2002). If a joint venture is unsuccessful, a 
larger firm is better able to survive the losses (Denning et al., 2006). 
  The size of US firms is measured by the natural log of total assets. Data is 
collected from Compustat for the year before announcements. 
 
Corporate governance variables 
Governance Index (GINDEX) 
Gompers, Metrick, Ishii (2003) construct a governance index (G-index) as a 
proxy for the balance of power between managers and shareholders using 24 distinct 
corporate-governance provisions. The governance index is constructed by adding one 
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point for every provision that reduces shareholder rights. Higher index levels 
correspond to more management power and weaker shareholder rights. They find 
firms with lower G-index (stronger shareholder rights) have higher stock returns, 
higher firm value, and better operation performance. They consider three explanations 
for these results, and find some evidence that weaker shareholder rights cause 
additional agency costs and poor corporate performance. Masulis, Wang, and Xie 
(2007) find that acquisition announcements by firms with higher G-index experience 
lower abnormal acquirer returns. They suggest that managers at firms with a higher G-
index are more likely to indulge in unprofitable acquisitions. This is consistent with 
one of three explanations proposed by Gompers, Metrick, Ishii (2003), that weaker 
shareholder rights generate additional manager-shareholder agency costs. Therefore, 
the agency explanation predicts a negative relation between abnormal returns and the 
G-index. 
I obtain the G-index data prior to announcement dates from RiskMetrics 
(formerly IRRC) Governance database. The database covers eight publication years: 
1990, 1993, 1995, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, and 2006. Following Gompers, Metrick, 
Ishii (2003), for years between two consecutive publication years, I use the data for 
the previous publication year.   
 
Institutional ownership (INSTITUTIONOWN) 
Joint ventures are investments made by managers, so they may or may not 
maximize shareholders’ wealth (Frohls et al., 1998). Park and Kim (1997) show that 
US partners with higher institutional ownership report higher abnormal returns around 
joint venture announcements. They suggest that institutional ownership becomes a 
disciplinary mechanism to press top managers to pursue strategies that can improve 
shareholder returns. The agency explanation predicts a positive effect of institutional 
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ownership on abnormal returns upon joint venture announcements. However, the 
insignificant effect of institutional ownership on acquirer returns is reported by 
Masulis, Wang and Xie (2007).11 
Institutional ownership is defined as shares held by institutions divided by 
shares outstanding. The level of institutional ownership is measured at the end of the 
calendar quarter preceding the joint venture announcement. I obtain institutional 
holdings data from Thomson Reuters CDA/Spectrum Institutional (13f) Holdings 
database, and sum shares held by all institutions to get the aggregated institutional 
holdings. Shares outstanding data are collected from CRSP. 
 
Insider ownership (INSIDEROWN) 
Lewellen, Loderer, and Rosenfeld (1985) show that low management 
ownership in bidder firms is associated with lower abnormal returns from acquisitions. 
They suggest that management ownership helps align the interests of managers and 
shareholders, and that managers who hold a large percent of their own company’s 
stock are less likely to make acquisitions that reduce shareholder wealth. Insider 
ownership has a positive effect on abnormal returns, according to the agency 
explanation. 
However, intentions of overconfident CEOs and other managers are consistent 
with those of shareholders. They simply misperceive the situation, and higher insider 
ownership as an incentive to increase shareholder value does not help them make a 
better decision, probably “perpetuat[ing] their distorted behavior”.12  
                                                 
11
 Masulis, Wang and Xie (2007) find that percentage ownership by a firm’s largest institutional 
blockholder has an insignificant positive effect on CAR, and that percentage ownership by 18 public 
pension funds has an insignificant negative effect on CAR. They suggest that public pension fund 
activism does not increase shareholder value. 
12
 “CEO hubris distorts investment decisions,” Stanford GSB News, December 2005. 
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Following Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2007), Himmelberg, Hubbard, and 
Love (2002), I measure insider ownership by using the “closely held shares 
percentage”13 variable taken from the Worldscope database for the days before 
announcements. 
 
Combined CEO-chair (CEOCHAIR) 
Both hubris and agency explanation predict a negative effect of CEO-chair 
duality. The major responsibilities of the board of directors include advising, 
monitoring managers and approving major corporate decisions (Masulis, Wang, and 
Xie, 2007). Jensen (1993) points out that “For the board to be effective, it is important 
to separate the CEO and chairman positions.” Hayward and Hambrick (1997) find that 
the positive relationship between CEO hubris and acquisition premiums is accentuated 
when the board lacks vigilance. They use the CEO-chairman duality as an indicator of 
weak board vigilance, suggesting that the boards best able to resist CEOs with hubris 
have board chairs other than the CEO. Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2007) find that the 
CEO-chair duality has a significant negative effect on announcement returns of 
bidders. They suggest that the CEO-chair separation can help to rein in empire-
building acquisitions by CEOs and lead to greater shareholder wealth. 
I define the combined CEO-chair as a dummy variable. When the CEO is also 
the chair of the board of directors, it equals one. When the CEO and chair are not the 
same individual, it equals zero. I collect data from RiskMetrics (formerly IRRC) 
Directors database. Since RiskMetrics only covers the years 1996-2006, I collect data 
                                                 
13
 Worldscope defines closely held shares as representing shares held by insiders. This includes shares 
held by officers, directors and their immediate families; shares held by individuals who hold 5% or 
more of outstanding shares; shares held in trust; shares held by pension/benefit plans, and any other 
corporation. Worldscope defines closely held shares percentage as the number of closely held shares 
over common shares outstanding. 
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for other years from Compustat Executive Compensation or company proxy 
statements.14 
 
1.5.2 Regression results 
Summary statistics of all regression variables are presented in Table 1.5. The 
mean of firm size, Tobin’s q, leverage, free cash flow, and governance index is close 
to that of US acquirers reported in Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2007). The mean of 
insider ownership of my sample (9.51%) is close to 7.94% for a sample of US firms 
on the Worldscope database reported in Dahlquist, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson 
(2003). The average of institutional ownership in my sample is 61.57%, which is 
similar to the percentage (60%) reported by Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell (2008) for 
their sample of US firms. The CEO is also the chairman of the board 84% of the time, 
which is broadly similar to the mean of 75.6% in Core, Holthausen, and Larcker 
(1999) and 86% in Rajgopal, Shevlin, and Zamora (2006). These suggest that my 
sample is representative.   
 
Table 1.5: Summary statistics for the variables used in the analysis 
 Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation 25% 75% 
Firm size 9.33 9.16 1.75 8.12 10.48 
Tobin’s q 1.78 1.53 1.14 1.23 1.95 
Leverage 0.18 0.17 0.10 0.12 0.23 
Free cash flow 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.01 0.06 
Recent performance -0.19 -0.16 0.30 -0.36 -0.008 
Governance index 9.10 9.00 2.90 7 12 
Institutional ownership 61.57 62.44 15.41 52.64 71.95 
Insider ownership 9.51 1.48 15.23 0.27 13.22 
Combined CEO-chair 0.84 1 0.36 1 1 
 
                                                 
14
 I obtain companies’ historical proxy statements through the SEC’s EDGAR database or Thomson 
ONE Banker. 
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The Pearson correlation matrix is shown in Table 1.6. These correlations 
provide preliminary support for managerial hubris. CAR is significantly negatively 
correlated with recent performance.  
Table 1.6: Pearson correlation matrix for regression variables 
CAR is the cumulative abnormal returns over event window [-2, +2]. FIRMSIZE is 
the natural log of total assets. TOBINQ is the ratio of market value of assets divided 
by book value of assets. LEVERAGE is the long-term debt over book value of the 
asset. FCF is free cash flow, measured as operating income before depreciation, minus 
interest expenses, minus income taxes, minus capital expenditures, and then scaled by 
book value of total assets. RECENTPERFORM is the recent performance, measured 
as the 12-month cumulative abnormal return above the equally weighted index prior to 
day -11. GINDEX is the governance index. INSTITUTIONOWN is the Institutional 
ownership which equals shares held by institutions divided by shares outstanding. 
INSIDEROWN is the insider ownership using “closely held shares percentage” from 
the Worldscope database. CEOCHAIR is a dummy variable that equals 1 when the 
chairman of board and CEO are the same individual and 0 otherwise. P-values are 
shown in parentheses under correlations. 
 
  
Variable CAR FIRM
SIZE 
TOBI
NQ 
LEVER
AGE 
FCF RECE
NTPE
RFOR
M 
GIND
EX 
INSTI
TUTI
ONO
WN 
INSIDE
ROWN 
FIRMSIZE 0.057         
 (0.40)         
TOBINQ -0.027 -0.081        
 (0.69) (0.23)        
LEVERAGE -0.004 -0.067 -0.192       
 (0.94) (0.32) (0.00)       
FCF -0.092 -0.353 0.632 -0.161      
 (0.18) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)      
RECENTPERFO
RM -0.237 0.013 0.051 0.052 0.089     
 (0.00) (0.84) (0.45) (0.44) (0.19)     
GINDEX -0.063 -0.367 -0.004 -0.076 0.173 -0.015    
 (0.35) (0.00) (0.95) (0.27) (0.01) (0.82)    
INSTITUTIONO
WN -0.155 -0.144 -0.001 0.057 0.063 0.258 0.292   
 (0.02) (0.03) (0.97) (0.40) (0.35) (0.00) (0.00)   
INSIDEROWN -0.002 -0.286 -0.056 0.088 0.026 -0.002 -0.173 -0.248  
 (0.97) (0.00) (0.41) (0.20) (0.69) (0.97) (0.01) (0.00)  
CEOCHAIR 0.019 0.118 0.041 0.050 -0.056 -0.165 -0.063 -0.075 -0.046 
 (0.77) (0.08) (0.55) (0.46) (0.41) (0.01) (0.36) (0.27) (0.50) 
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A more definitive test requires cross-sectional regression analysis, as presented 
in Table 1.7. The dependent variable is the CAR for the event window [-2, +2]. 
Regression model 1 includes only three control variables, none of them significant. 
Model 4 adds the hubris variable (recent performance), adjusted-R2 increases to 
4.19%. I find that the hubris variable has a coefficient of -3.334 with a t-statistic of -
3.51, significant at the 1% level. Model 7 also includes free cash flow and four 
corporate governance variables. None of them has a significant effect on CAR, but the 
hubris variable still has a significant negative coefficient of -2.909. 
 
Table 1.7: Cross-sectional regression analysis 
This table reports regressions of cumulative abnormal return from 2 days before to 2 
days after the announcement (CAR [-2, +2]) in percentage points on US partners’ 
characteristics and corporate governance variables. In parentheses are White 
heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance, respectively. 
 
 
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Constant -0.896 -0.121 3.643 -1.911 1.046 1.518 
  (-0.48) (-0.06) (1.16) (-1.04) (0.33) (0.48) 
Firm size 0.132 0.045 -0.044 0.145 0.064 0.006 
 (0.79) (0.25) (-0.22) (0.89) (0.33) (0.03) 
Tobin’s q -0.088 0.168 0.136 -0.030 -0.051 0.130 
 (-0.34) (0.50) (0.40) (-0.12) (-0.20) (0.39) 
Leverage -0.218 -0.547 -0.177 0.44 0.461 0.241 
 (-0.07) (-0.19) (-0.06) (0.15) (0.16) (0.08) 
Free cash flow  -9.118 -8.559   -6.458 
  (-1.20) (-1.12)   (-0.86) 
Recent performance    -3.334*** -2.991*** -2.909*** 
    (-3.51) (-3.01) (-2.91) 
Governance index   -0.018  -0.048 -0.040 
   (-0.16)  (-0.42) (-0.35) 
Institutional 
ownership   -0.043**  -0.025 -0.026 
   (-2.11)  (-1.23) (-1.24) 
Insider ownership   -0.012  -0.007 -0.007 
   (-0.55)  (-0.33) (-0.34) 
Adjusted-R2 -1.06% -0.85% 0.03% 4.19% 3.73% 3.6% 
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Table 1.7 (continued) 
 
Independent variable (7) (8) (9) 
Constant 1.742 1.036 1.625 
  (0.54) (0.33) (0.51) 
Firm size 0.014 0.015 0.042 
 (0.07) (0.08) (0.21) 
Tobin’s q 0.143 0.185 0.239 
 (0.43) (0.56) (0.72) 
Leverage 0.354 0.341 0.710 
 (0.12) (0.12) (0.25) 
Free cash flow -6.614 -8.556 -9.482 
 (-0.88) (-1.15) (-1.27) 
Recent performance -2.988*** 2.594 3.516 
 (-2.95) (1.06) (1.39) 
Governance index -0.040 -0.017 -0.014 
 (-0.35) (-0.16) (-0.13) 
Institutional ownership -0.026 -0.024 -0.024 
 (-1.25) (-1.18) (-1.20) 
Insider ownership -0.007 -0.008 -0.009 
 (-0.35) (-0.40) (-0.44) 
Combined CEO-chair -0.396  -1.222 
 (-0.48)  (-1.43) 
Recent performance × 
Combined CEO-chair  -6.304** -7.639*** 
  (-2.46) (-2.80) 
Adjusted-R2 3.23% 5.96% 6.44% 
 
To test whether the relation between the source of managerial hubris and CAR 
is strengthened when board vigilance is weak, I add the interaction term of “recent 
performance” and “combined CEO-chair” in regression models 8 and 9. The 
coefficient is significantly negative. When there is a combination of managerial hubris 
and combined CEO-chair, CAR is particularly low. These results are consistent with 
the finding for acquisitions in Hayward and Hambrick (1997). 
Overall, the results show that the worst joint venture investments are made by 
firms with the best recent performance, and suggest that managerial hubris tends to 
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damage shareholder returns. The results also suggest that an independent and vigilant 
board may resist the detrimental effect of managerial hubris. There is no evidence that 
agency problems significantly lower shareholder abnormal returns upon joint venture 
announcements. 
 
1.6 Further evidence on managerial hubris 
1.6.1 CAR for high hubris vs. low hubris firms 
 I partition US partners into quintiles based on the hubris variable (12-month 
preannouncement CAR) as Lin et al. (2008). Q1 is the low hubris quintile and Q5 is 
the high hubris quintile. Then I conduct event studies for Q1 and Q5 firms. Results are 
reported in Table 1.8. Low hubris US firms significantly gain, CAR for [-2, +2], [-5, 
+5] and [-10, +10] are 1.81%, 1.91% and 4.11% respectively, while high hubris US 
firms significantly lose on the announcement of joint ventures, CAR[-10, +10] is -
2.6%. Low hubris firms significantly outperform high hubris firms in the event period. 
For the [-2, +2] window, the difference is 2.31% and significant at the 5% level. For 
the [-10, +10] window, the difference is 6.71%, and significant at the 1% level. 
Table 1.8: CAR for high hubris vs. low hubris US firms 
US partners are ranked by 12-month preannouncement CAR. Z-statistics are reported 
in parentheses below the mean CAR. T-statistics and associated p-values are reported 
for differences between low hubris firms (Q1, quintile 1) and high hubris firms (Q5, 
quintile 5). ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance, respectively. 
  
 Low hubris High hubris    
CAR interval Q1 Q5 Q1-Q5 t-test Pr>| t | 
CAR [0, +1] 0.54 0.51 0.03 0.03 0.9730 
 (1.195) (1.517)    
CAR [-1, +1] 0.45 0.50 -0.05 -0.06 0.9557 
 (0.877) (0.824)    
CAR [-2, +2] 1.81*** -0.50 2.31** 2.50 0.0145 
 (2.662) (-0.415)    
CAR [-5, +5] 1.91** -0.31 2.22 1.47 0.1450 
 (2.054) (-0.085)    
CAR [-10, +10] 4.11*** -2.60** 6.71*** 3.38 0.0011 
 (2.941) (-2.029)    
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1.6.2 Managerial hubris and trading volume 
Differences of opinion or interpretation about public announcements among 
investors can generate high trading volume (Harris and Raviv, 1993; Kandel and 
Person, 1995). Doukas and Petmezas (2007) propose that if investors construe that 
managerial overconfidence increases uncertainty about the future prospects of an 
investment, trading volume should increase around announcements due to intensified 
differences of opinion among investors. I examine and compare the abnormal trading 
volume around announcements by high hubris firms and low hubris firms in Table 1.9. 
Cumulative abnormal trading volume around announcements for high hubris firms is 
77.60% and statistically significant at 1% during the event window [-2, +2], while 
abnormal trading volume for low hubris firms is 5.26% and not significant. My results 
are consistent with results from Doukas and Petmezas (2007) and further support the 
hubris-driven inefficient joint venture investments. 
 
1.7 Summary and Conclusions 
 This paper pioneers in establishing the relation between Roll’s well-known 
hubris theory and international joint venture investments. The results are consistent 
with the Malmendier and Tate’s (2008) argument that “managerial overconfidence can 
account for corporate investment distortions.”  
The results in this paper provide valuable insights for corporate managers who 
are currently in charge of well-performing companies and plan to invest abroad. 
Initiation of foreign joint ventures must be taken with very careful evaluation instead 
of acting on their own past success, or the hubris and overconfidence stemming from 
past success. As results suggest, if hubris can be curbed, joint ventures abroad bring 
significant gains to US shareholders. 
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Table 1.9: Trading volume around joint venture announcements for the whole 
sample, high hubris firms (Q5) and low hubris firms (Q1) 
Abnormal trading volumes are generated as the differences between trading volume 
and the mean of daily volume for that stock over the window (-170, -21) normalized 
by the mean volume. Following Brown and Warner (1980), a t-test is applied to 
examine the significance of the standardized mean abnormal trading volume. ***, ** 
and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance, respectively. 
 
Average abnormal relative volume (%) 
Event day 
or window All T-stat 
High 
hubris T-stat 
Low 
hubris T-stat 
-10 0.88 0.327      3.67 0.590 1.43 0.269   
-9 3.46 1.280      7.15 1.149     8.78 1.652* 
-8 1.62 0.599     5.22 0.840   3.00 0.565   
-7 0.29 0.109       5.34 0.858    2.07 0.390 
-6 -1.78 -0.659         -4.22 -0.678      0.95 0.179    
-5 0.37 0.137    1.94 0.311           3.17 0.595      
-4 -0.39 -0.145    3.12 0.502      6.20 1.167      
-3 4.86 1.797*    8.11 1.304       15.41 2.898*** 
-2 -0.39 -0.145     5.07 0.815         -1.15 -0.216    
-1 6.30 2.329**   20.23 3.252*** -2.70 -0.507      
0 5.37 1.986**    8.52 1.371 4.71 0.887    
+1 8.87 3.281*** 27.90 4.486*** -0.61 -0.115 
+2 3.91 1.445   15.88 2.553** 5.00 0.940   
+3 3.10 1.148         10.90 1.753* 4.02 0.755    
+4 2.18 0.808    9.00 1.447 -1.82 -0.343 
+5 0.12 0.046      5.93 0.954    -4.75 -0.894     
+6 0.54 0.202 4.66 0.749   -1.22 -0.230      
+7 5.79 2.141** 12.16 1.956* -3.04 -0.571      
+8 2.72 1.006    11.24 1.808* -9.00 -1.693*     
+9 4.41 1.633     4.66 0.749    2.90 0.545     
+10 3.65 1.350     -2.70 -0.435   1.76 0.330        
[0, +1] 14.24 3.724*** 36.43 4.141*** 4.10 0.546 
[-1, +1] 20.54 4.385***     56.65 5.259*** 1.41 0.153 
[-2, +2] 24.05 3.978***     77.60 5.580***   5.26 0.442    
[-5, +5] 34.31 3.825*** 116.60 5.653*** 27.48 1.558     
[-10, -3] 9.31 1.218     30.33 1.724* 41.02 2.728*** 
[+3, +10] 22.53 2.946*** 55.85 3.175*** -11.16 -0.742    
 
The paper also provides important implications for corporate governance. 
“Incentive compatible” corporate governance mechanisms that help to reduce agency 
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problems and align interests between mangers and shareholders are not helpful for 
alleviating problems caused by managerial hubris, because overconfident managers 
think that they are acting in the interest of shareholders. An independent and vigilant 
board of directors is important in investment selection and evaluation to 
counterbalance CEO overconfidence and managerial hubris and achieve first-best 
investment (Malmendier and Tate, 2008). 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
SHAREHOLDER VALUE OF INTERNATIONAL JOINT VENTURES, 
INDUSTRIAL DIVERSIFICATION AND PARTNER RELATEDNESS  
 
2.1 Introduction 
The idea of the paper is motivated by two streams in the literature.  
The first of these streams involves the effect of industrial diversification on 
shareholder value. Many papers examine this issue in the context of domestic 
corporate decisions such as acquisitions, divestitures, spinoffs, equity offerings, and so 
on. Other papers do so in the context of foreign direct investments, but focus on 
international acquisitions or Greenfield FDI.15 No paper has systematically 
investigated this effect in the context of international joint venture investments, one of 
three main modes of FDI. At this time, there is no consensus in empirical findings 
concerning the effect of the industrial diversification on shareholder value. 
The second involves the shareholder value of international joint ventures, 
particularly how partner business relatedness influences the value creation of IJVs for 
joint venture partners. Several papers investigate the effect of business relatedness of 
joint venture partners on the shareholder value of JV partners, but provide mixed 
empirical results. Partner participation is a unique feature for joint venture 
investments, and is not relevant to other types of FDI, such as Greenfield FDI and 
international acquisitions. 
Motivated by the literature, I use a comprehensive database to study the 
following questions: What is the effect of industrial diversification on shareholder 
                                                 
15
 Foreign direct investment (FDI) includes three main modes: international acquisitions, international 
joint ventures, and Greenfield FDI.  
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value in the context of IJV investments? What is the effect of the partner business 
relatedness on the shareholder value of IJV partners?         
In this paper, I employ the SDC database to study the shareholder value of US 
firms that made international joint venture announcements during the 1999-2008 
period. I examine whether IJV investments are more profitable for US firms that 
expand their core businesses than those that expand their non-core businesses. I also 
investigate whether the shareholder value of US partners is affected by their business 
relatedness with corresponding foreign partners. 
The main findings of the paper are: (1) In general, shareholders in US firms 
realize positive and significant abnormal returns upon their IJV announcements. (2) 
Diversifiying IJV investments is associated with a larger gain in the shareholder value 
of US partners than focused IJV investments, on average.16 (3) Partner business 
relatedness has a negative effect on US shareholder value for diversifying IJV 
investments, but does not influence US shareholder value for focused IJV investments. 
(4) IJV investments are expected to create the highest value for US partners when all 
three entities (US partner, foreign partner, and IJV) operate in different core 
businesses.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 reviews 
related literature. Sample selection and description are in Section 2.3. Section 2.4 
discusses methodology and empirical results for shareholder value upon IJV 
announcements. Section 2.5 summarizes and concludes the paper. 
 
2.2 Literature review 
2.2.1 Industrial diversification and shareholder value 
                                                 
16
 In Doukas and Lang (2003) and this paper, the term “diversifying” represents industrial 
diversification, not geographic diversification of investments.  
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 In this section, I focus on the literature of domestic industrial diversification 
and shareholder value. The section that follows will discuss papers about industrial 
diversification and shareholder value in the context of foreign direct investments. 
Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990) study a sample of US acquisitions between 
1975 and 1987. They classify acquisitions into related acquisitions and unrelated 
acquisitions. If the bidder and the target have a 4-digit SIC code in common among 
their top three businesses, acquisitions are classified as related acquisitions. They find 
that the abnormal returns for unrelated acquisitions are significantly negative and 
lower than related acquisitions in the 1980s, but returns in related and unrelated 
acquisitions are not statistically different from those in the 1970s. They suggest that 
diversification may serve the objectives of managers at the cost of reducing 
shareholder value.   
Matsusaka (1993) examines the stock market response to a sample of 
acquisition announcements from New York Stock Exchange listing statements during 
the late 1960s and early 1970s. He divides acquisitions into two groups, and defines an 
acquisition as a “diversification acquisition” if the acquirer and target don’t have a 
two-digit SIC code in common. An acquisition is defined as a “related acquisition” if 
the acquirer and target do share a two-digit SIC code. He finds that acquirers earn a 
positive and significant return of 1.23% in the announcement period when they make 
diversification acquisitions. The abnormal return for related acquisitions is 0.35% and 
not significant.  
Some papers show that the stock market tends to react favorably to corporate 
decisions that increase corporate focus. Daley, Mehrotra, and Sivakumar (1997) 
investigate excess returns around spinoff announcements. They divide spinoffs into 
two subsamples. When the spunoff unit is in a different two-digit SIC code from the 
core business of the pre-spinoff firm, it is in the subsample of cross-industry spinoffs. 
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When the spunoff unit is in the same industry, it is classified as an own-industry 
spinoff. Cross-industry spinoffs are associated with an increase in corporate focus. 
They find that the mean CAR (cumulative abnormal return) over [-1, 0] is 4.3% and 
significant at the 1% level for cross-industry spinoffs, and that CAR [-1, 0] is 1.4% 
and insignificant. They suggest that spinoffs create value through removing non-core 
businesses and allowing managers to focus on core businesses. John and Ofek (1995) 
analyze stock market reactions to divestiture announcements and find that the 
abnormal return to the seller is greater for focus-increasing divestitures. A divestiture 
is defined as focus-increasing if the 4-digit SIC code of the divested division is 
different from the primary 4-digit code of the seller. Markides (1992) examines stock 
market reaction to corporate refocusing announcements during 1980-1988. The mean 
two-day CAR is 1.73% and significant. They classify sample firms into the 
overdiversified group and the not overdiversified group. They find that the 
overdiversified group has a highly significant CAR and the not overdiversified group 
has an insignificant CAR, and suggest that the relationship between diversification and 
profitability is curvilinear. The relationship is positive at low levels of diversity and 
becomes negative when a firm’s diversification is beyond its optimal level. 
Hyland and Diltz (2002) examine announcement returns of firms that diversify 
through acquisition and internal growth during 1978-1992. They find that abnormal 
announcement return is positive and significant and suggest that diversification events 
are not associated with value destruction. They also find that diversifiers with higher 
ratios of research and development expenditure to assets have higher announcement 
returns, and suggest that those diversifiers are able to exploit R&D advantages in 
operations that are new to them.   
 Hadlock, Ryngaert, and Thomas (2001) provide evidence of the beneficial 
effect of industrial diversification on equity offerings. They study a sample of equity 
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issues during 1983-1994, and find that the market reaction to equity issue 
announcements is less negative for diversified firms than for focused firms. They 
suggest that because errors the market makes in valuing unrelated segments of a 
company are imperfectly related, errors are generally smaller for a diversified 
company than for a focused company. Diversification improves access to the market 
for external capital. 
    
2.2.2 Shareholder value of foreign direct investments and industrial diversification 
 Firms engage in foreign direct investments through three main modes: 
international acquisitions, international joint ventures, and Greenfield FDI. How does 
industrial diversification influence the shareholder value of different modes of foreign 
direct investments? This section reviews several papers that attempt to answer this 
question. Most papers in this literature examine the effect of industrial diversification 
on shareholder value of international acquisitions.  
Doukas and Lang (2003) study the effect of industrial diversification on 
shareholder value of FDI using a sample of US firms that made Greenfield FDI 
announcements during the period 1980-1992. Theirs is the first study of the valuation 
effect of Greenfield FDI. They define investments within the firm’s main four-digit 
SIC code as focused investments, and investments outside the primary four-digit SIC 
code as diversifying investments.17 The three main findings in their paper are as 
follows. First, the 2-day [-1, 0] average abnormal return for focused investments is 
0.24% and significant at the 10% level, the [-1, 0] abnormal return for diversifying 
investments is -0.38% and significant at the 5% level, and the return difference 
between the two types of investment is significant at the 5% level. This suggests that 
                                                 
17
 Doukas and Lang (2003) use focused, related, and core-related interchangeably. They also use 
diversifying, non-core-related, and unrelated interchangeably. Since I incorporate partner business 
relatedness into my paper, the terms focused and related are not interchangeable in it.  
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core-related Greenfield FDI is beneficial to shareholder value, but non-core-related 
Greenfield FDI could lead to operation inefficiencies and have a negative effect on 
firm value. Second, the gain from focused Greenfield FDI is greater for multi-segment 
than single-segment firms, which suggests that focused Greenfield FDI has positive 
effects on the non-core business of a firm, as well. Third, the loss from diversifying 
Greenfield FDI is larger for single-segment than multi-segment firms. They suggest 
that single-segment firms are probably on a survival path because they have exhausted 
their domestic core-business competencies when they make non-core-related 
investments, and that multi-segment firms are capable of handling the risks of new 
business.   
 Doukas and Travlos (1988) analyze US companies engaged in international 
acquisitions from 1975-1983. They find that the effect of the industrial diversification 
on US bidding firms’ [-1, 0] abnormal returns is positive but not statistically 
significant. Markides and Ittner (1994) investigate the effect of 276 US international 
acquisitions made in 1975-1988 on the shareholder value of US bidding firms, with 
findings different from those of Doukas and Travlos (1988). They find that the two-
day [-1, 0] abnormal return for related acquisitions is 0.55% with a t-statistic of 2.86, 
while the corresponding abnormal return for unrelated acquisitions is -0.87% with a t-
statistic of -3.08. They suggest that related acquisitions are associated with higher 
benefits and lower integration costs than unrelated acquisitions.  
Guo, Keown, and Sen (2001) study the stock market reaction of both American 
and Japanese firms to public announcements of international mergers, acquisitions, 
and joint ventures during 1980-1991. They find that, on average, both American and 
Japanese firms experience a significant positive reaction to announcements. Then they 
compare stock market reaction to focused combinations versus non-focused 
combinations. For American firms, the announcement day abnormal return of focused 
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combinations is 8.0% and significant, and the abnormal return of non-focused 
combinations is 2.8% and significant. In contrast, for Japanese firms, the abnormal 
return on day 0 of focused combinations is -0.1% and not significant, but the day 0 
abnormal return of non-focused combinations is positive and significant. Further 
analysis shows that the positive and significant reaction to non-focused combinations 
is only for Japanese Keiretsu firms. This suggests that the Keiretsu membership 
controls costs of diversification resulting from overinvestment in negative NPV 
projects and subsidization of poorly performing business segments, allowing for 
benefits of diversification. 
 Studying a sample of announcements of international joint ventures over 
January 1986 to December 1990, Merchant and Schendel (2000) find a positive and 
significant relationship between partner-joint venture business relatedness and value 
creation of US partners upon announcements. They suggest that stock markets expect 
partner firms to benefit from joint ventures that yield greater economies of scale.   
 
2.2.3 Shareholder value of joint ventures and partner relatedness   
 What is the effect of partner business relatedness on shareholder value of joint 
ventures? The literature provides a mixed answer. Koh and Venkatraman (1991) find 
that partner relatedness increases the shareholder value of a partner. Balakrishnan and 
Koza (1993), Reuer and Koza (2000), and Johnson and Houston (2000) suggest that 
partner relatedness decreases shareholder value. Merchant and Schendel (2000) do not 
find a statistically significant relation between the shareholder value of joint ventures 
and partner relatedness. This section reviews each paper mentioned above. 
Koh and Venkatraman (1991) focus on joint ventures announced in the 
information technology sector over the 1972-86 period. They analyze abnormal 
returns in the announcement period [-1, 0] of the related partner subgroup and the 
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unrelated partner subgroup. The abnormal return for the related partner subgroup is 
1.05% and significant at the 1% level, whereas the abnormal return for the unrelated 
partner subgroup is 0.12% and not statistically significant. They suggest that joint 
ventures involving related partners are more productive for partners than those 
involving unrelated partners considering the potential costs and difficulties in getting 
unrelated partners to work together efficiently. 
 Balakrishnan and Koza (1993) study investor reactions to joint venture 
announcements using a sample of joint ventures from 1974-1977. They divide joint 
ventures into “monopoly portfolio” and “non-monopoly portfolio” based on the SIC 
code of partners’ primary businesses. For joint ventures in the monopoly portfolio, 
businesses of joint venture partners are within the same 4 or 3 digit SIC code. The 
abnormal return for the monopoly portfolio is positive but insignificant, while the 
abnormal return for the non-monopoly portfolio is positive and significant at the 0.01 
level. The difference between the abnormal returns of the two sub-samples is 
statistically significant at the 0.01 level. This suggests that investors will react more 
favorably to joint venture announcements when the primary business operations of 
joint venture partners are dissimilar. It is difficult for partners in dissimilar businesses 
to appraise the value of each other’s assets in acquisitions, and the joint venture is an 
efficient mechanism for pooling complementary assets.   
Reuer and Koza (2000) study abnormal returns from joint venture formation 
using a sample of 297 domestic and international joint ventures. They test and support 
the “asymmetric information perspective” on joint ventures. The “asymmetric 
information perspective” posits that joint ventures are attractive vehicles for reducing 
costs and the uncertainty of valuing complementary assets in acquisitions. This 
suggests that the stock market responds favorably when partner firms operate in 
different industries and there is asymmetric information between partners. They 
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classify joint ventures into one of four information asymmetry groups based on the 
joint venture and partner firms’ industries at the three-digit SIC level. In group 1, both 
partner firms and the joint venture are in the same industry. In group 2, partner firms 
are in the same industry, but the joint venture is in a different industry. For group 3, 
the joint venture operates in the industry of only one partner. For group 4, the two 
partners in the joint venture operate in different industries. Their empirical results 
show that the shareholder value of joint venture formation announcements are 
negative or insignificant for joint ventures in groups 1 and 2, and positive and 
significant for joint ventures in groups 3 and 4, involving information asymmetry. 
These results also hold when they analyze the domestic and international joint 
ventures respectively.         
 Johnson and Houston (2000) examine the shareholder value of joint venture 
announcements in The Wall Street Journal from 1991-1995. They distinguish joint 
ventures as horizontal joint ventures and vertical joint ventures. Partner firms are in 
horizontal relationships if they have the same two-digit SIC codes, and partner firms 
are in vertical relationships if they have different two-digit SIC codes. They find that 
there are positive and significant abnormal returns for announcements of horizontal 
joint ventures, and suggest that horizontal joint ventures create synergistic gains for 
partner firms. Abnormal returns for vertical joint venture announcements are also 
positive and significant, and higher than abnormal returns for horizontal joint ventures. 
This suggests that vertical joint ventures are viewed favorably by stock markets 
because they represent a partial combination of partners’ resources and avoid the 
value-reducing problems associated with the full integration of dissimilar partners.            
Merchant and Schendel (2000) study a sample of announcements of joint 
ventures involving US firms and non-US partners from January 1986 to December 
1990. They didn’t find a statistically significant effect of partner-partner business 
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relatedness on the US partner’s abnormal returns around JV announcements. They 
suggest that the advantages of partnering with related firms may be neutralized by 
higher costs of managing joint venture partners who are also direct competitors.   
 
2.3 Sample selection and description 
The sample in this study consists of US firms that announced joint ventures in 
foreign countries. The time period for the study spans 10 years from 1999 to 2008. 
The sample is collected from the Thomson Financial SDC platinum joint ventures 
database. This database includes worldwide joint venture information from sources 
such as the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings and their 
international counterparts, trade publications, wires and news sources. Each IJV in my 
sample is formed between one US firm and one foreign firm. US firms are traded on 
the NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ. The daily stock returns of US companies making 
IJV announcements have to be available from the Center for Research in Security 
Prices (CRSP). The final sample yields 1042 IJV announcements.  
Table 2.1: Sample distribution of IJV announcements by year 
 
Year 
Number of 
announcements 
Percent of 
sample 
1999 193 18.54 
2000 206 19.79 
2001 107 10.28 
2002 83 7.97 
2003 46 4.42 
2004 41 3.94 
2005 74 7.11 
2006 78 7.49 
2007 97 9.32 
2008 116 11.14 
Total 1042 100.00 
Table 2.1 shows the frequency of IJVs in terms of their year of 
announcements. For the past 10 years, the largest number of IJV announcements in 
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one year is 206 (19.79%) in 2000, followed by 193 (18.54%) in 1999. The number of 
IJV announcements falls sharply from 2000 till 2004, but increases steadily afterward.  
Table 2.2: Sample distribution of IJV announcements by IJV host country 
 
IJV host country Frequency Percent IJV host country Frequency Percent 
Algeria 1 0.10 Morocco 1 0.10 
Argentina 4 0.38 Neth Antilles 1 0.10 
Australia 38 3.65 Netherlands 13 1.25 
Austria 2 0.19 New Zealand 4 0.38 
Bahamas 1 0.10 Nicaragua 1 0.10 
Bahrain 1 0.10 Nigeria 1 0.10 
Belgium 6 0.58 Norway 4 0.38 
Bermuda 3 0.29 Pakistan 1 0.10 
Brazil 32 3.07 Panama 1 0.10 
British Virgin 1 0.10 Paraguay 1 0.10 
Canada 33 3.17 Peru 2 0.19 
Chile 4 0.38 Philippines 7 0.67 
China 234 22.48 Poland 1 0.10 
Colombia 3 0.29 Portugal 2 0.19 
Costa Rica 1 0.10 Qatar 2 0.19 
Czech Republic 4 0.38 Romania 3 0.29 
Denmark 1 0.10 Russian Fed 25 2.40 
Dominican Rep 1 0.10 Saudi Arabia 11 1.06 
Ecuador 1 0.10 Serbia & Mont. 1 0.10 
Egypt 2 0.19 Singapore 17 1.63 
Finland 4 0.38 Slovak Rep 1 0.10 
France 14 1.34 South Africa 12 1.15 
Germany 32 3.07 South Korea 34 3.27 
Greece 2 0.19 Spain 6 0.58 
Hong Kong 25 2.40 Sri Lanka 2 0.19 
Hungary 1 0.10 Surinam 1 0.10 
India 85 8.17 Sweden 8 0.77 
Indonesia 8 0.77 Switzerland 8 0.77 
Ireland-Rep 5 0.48 Taiwan 13 1.25 
Israel 3 0.29 Thailand 11 1.06 
Italy 20 1.92 Tunisia 1 0.10 
Japan 96 9.22 Turkey 9 0.86 
Jersey 1 0.10 United Kingdom 81 7.78 
Kuwait 3 0.29 Uruguay 1 0.10 
Lithuania 1 0.10 Utd Arab Em 13 1.25 
Luxembourg 1 0.10 Uzbekistan 4 0.38 
Macau 1 0.10 Venezuela 4 0.38 
Malaysia 12 1.15 Vietnam 10 0.96 
Mexico 36 3.46 Total 1042 100.00 
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Table 2.2 reports the distribution of IJVs by country. US firms in the sample 
invest in 77 foreign countries through the mode of IJVs. Notably, China is the most 
frequent destination country (22.48%). Other countries in the top 10 destination 
countries include Japan (9.22%), India (8.17%), the United Kingdom (7.78%), 
Australia (3.65%), Mexico (3.46%), South Korea (3.27%), Canada (3.17%), Brazil 
(3.07%), and Germany (3.07%). These countries account for 67.34% of all IJVs. 4 the 
top 10 countries, China, India, Mexico, and Brazil, are emerging and developing 
economies, and the six other countries are in the group of advanced economies.18 
Table 2.3 provides the distribution of US partners, foreign partners, and IJVs 
by four-digit standard industrial classification (SIC) codes. The sample exhibits a 
broad range of industries. The most IJVs are formed in information retrieval services 
(9.86%), followed by prepackaged software (3.77%), motor vehicle parts and 
accessories (3.48%), security brokers, dealers and flotation companies (2.61%), and 
management consulting services (2.32%). The largest group of US partners comes 
from prepackaged software (6.18%), followed by motor vehicle parts and accessories 
(5.02%), information retrieval services (3.86%), security brokers, dealers, and 
flotation companies (3.57%),  and plastic materials and synthetic resins (2.70%). Most 
foreign partners come from investors, nec (5.64%), followed by motor vehicles and 
passenger car bodies (3.79%), telephone communications, except radiotelephone 
(3.69%), banks (3.01%), and information retrieval services (2.53%). 
 
2.4 Shareholder value of US partners around IJV announcements  
2.4.1 Methodology 
  
                                                 
18
 The International Monetary Fund classifies the world into two major groups: advanced economies, 
and emerging and developing economies.  
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Table 2.3: Sample distribution of IJV announcements by primary industry of US 
partner, foreign partner, and IJV 
 
Four-
digit SIC 
code Industry 
Percent 
(US 
partner) 
Percent 
(foreign 
partner) 
Percen
t (IJV) 
1011 Iron ores  0.10  
1021 Copper ores 0.19 0.19  
1041 Gold ores 0.19 0.19 0.19 
1081 Metal mining services   0.10 
1099 Miscellaneous metal ores, nec   0.19 
1221 Bituminous coal and lignite surface mining  0.19  
1241 Coal mining services  0.29  
1311 Crude petroleum and natural gas 1.16 2.33 0.87 
1381 Drilling oil and gas wells 0.39 0.19 0.29 
1382 Oil and gas field exploration services 0.10 0.19 0.29 
1389 Oil and gas field services, nec 0.10 0.10 0.10 
1475 Phosphate rock   0.10 
1522 Residential construction, nec  0.39 0.10 
1541 Industrial buildings and warehouses  0.19 0.10 
1542 Nonresidential building construction, nec  0.19 0.19 
1623 Water, sewer, pipeline & utility line construction  0.10 0.19 
1629 Heavy construction, nec 0.10 0.10 0.39 
1731 Electrical work  0.10 0.10 
1799 Special trade contractors, nec   0.29 
2011 Meat packing plants 0.10 0.10 0.19 
2013 Sausages and other prepared meat products  0.10  
2015 Poultry slaughtering and processing 0.68 0.10 0.29 
2022 Natural, processed, and imitation cheese   0.10 
2023 Dry, condensed, and evaporated dairy products 0.10 0.10  
2026 Fluid milk   0.10 
2033 Canned fruits, vegetables, jams, and jellies  0.10 0.29 
2035 Pickled fruits and vegetables, salad dressings 0.39   
2041 Flour and other grain mill products 0.10 0.19  
2043 Cereal breakfast foods  0.10  
2044 Rice milling 0.10   
2045 Prepared flour mixes and doughs  0.10  
2046 Wet corn milling 0.10 0.10 0.10 
2048 Prepared animal feeds, except for dogs and cats  0.10  
2051 Bread and other bakery products, except cookies  0.10 0.10 
2062 Cane sugar refining  0.10 0.10 
2066 Chocolate and cocoa products 0.10 0.19  
2067 Chewing gum 0.10   
2074 Cottonseed oil mills 0.10   
2075 Soybean oil mills 0.48  0.29 
2082 Malt beverages 0.10 0.10 0.10 
2083 Malt  0.19  
2084 Wines, brandy, and brandy spirits 0.19 0.10  
2086 Bottled & canned soft drinks & carbonated waters 0.58 0.10 0.29 
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2087 Flavoring extracts and flavoring syrups, nec  0.10  
2095 Roasted coffee 0.29 0.19 0.19 
2099 Food preparations, nec 0.10 0.19 0.29 
2111 Cigarettes 0.19 0.10 0.10 
2131 Chewing and smoking tobacco and snuff  0.10  
2211 Broadwoven fabric mills, cotton 0.10 0.39 0.10 
2221 Broadwoven fabric mills, manmade fiber and silk 0.10  0.19 
2231 Broadwoven fabric mills, wool (including dyeing) 0.19 0.10  
2253 Knit outerwear mills 0.10 0.10  
2269 Finishers of textiles, nec  0.10 0.10 
2273 Carpets and rugs  0.10 0.10 
2281 Yarn spinning mills  0.19 0.10 
2295 Coated fabrics, not rubberized   0.10 
2298 Cordage and twine   0.10 
2299 Textile goods, nec  0.49 0.19 
2311 Men's and boys' suits, coats, and overcoats 0.10   
2321 Men's shirts and nightwear 0.29 0.10  
2326 Men's and boys' work clothing   0.10 
2329 Men's and boys' clothing, nec 0.10 0.19 0.10 
2331 Women's, misses', & juniors' blouses and shirts 0.10   
2386 Leather and sheep-lined clothing  0.19  
2421 Sawmills and planing mills 0.10 0.10 0.19 
2431 Millwork  0.10  
2436 Softwood veneer and plywood 0.10   
2452 Prefabricated wood buildings and components   0.10 
2511 Wood household furniture, except upholstered 0.10   
2512 Wood household furniture, upholstered 0.10   
2515 Mattresses, foundations, and convertible beds  0.10  
2519 Household furniture, nec   0.10 
2522 Office furniture, except wood 0.10 0.10 0.10 
2599 Furniture and fixtures, nec   0.10 
2611 Pulp mills  0.10 0.10 
2621 Paper mills 0.29 0.39  
2631 Paperboard mills 0.58 0.19 0.29 
2653 Corrugated and solid fiber boxes  0.10 0.10 
2655 Fiber cans, tubes, drums, and similar products 0.10  0.10 
2656 Sanitary food containers, except folding 0.10   
2671 Packaging paper & plastics film, coated & laminated  0.29 0.10 
2672 Coated and laminated paper, nec  0.10  
2676 Sanitary paper products 0.10  0.10 
2679 Converted paper and paperboard products, nec 0.10  0.10 
2711 Newspapers: publishing, or publishing & printing 0.10 0.39 0.10 
2721 Periodicals: publishing, or publishing & printing 0.10   
2731 Books: publishing, or publishing & printing 0.29 0.78 0.19 
2741 Miscellaneous publishing  0.10  
2752 Commercial printing, lithographic 0.10 0.10  
2754 Commercial printing  0.10  
2759 Commercial printing, nec  0.10 0.10 
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2813 Industrial gases 0.77 0.10 0.48 
2816 Inorganic pigments 0.19  0.10 
2819 Industrial inorganic chemicals, nec 2.03 0.87 0.48 
2821 Plastics materials and synthetic resins 2.70 1.17 2.13 
2822 Synthetic rubber (vulcanizable elastomers)   0.10 
2823 Cellulosic manmade fibers  0.19  
2824 Manmade organic fibers, except cellulosic  0.10 0.19 
2833 Medicinal chemicals and botanical products  0.10  
2834 Pharmaceutical preparations 1.54 1.55 0.87 
2835 In vitro and in vivo diagnostic substances   0.10 
2836 Biological products, except diagnostic substances 0.48 0.49 0.39 
2841 Soap & other detergents, except specialty cleaners  0.10 0.10 
2842 Specialty cleaning and polishing preparations 0.10   
2843 Surface active & finishing agents, sulfonated oils 0.10   
2844 Perfumes, cosmetics, and other toilet preparations 0.19 0.19 0.10 
2851 Paints, varnishes, lacquers, & allied products 0.29 0.58 0.68 
2869 Industrial organic chemicals, nec 0.77 0.68 0.97 
2873 Nitrogenous fertilizers 0.10 0.29  
2874 Phosphatic fertilizers   0.10 
2879 Pesticides and agricultural chemicals, nec 0.10  0.10 
2891 Adhesives and sealants 0.29  0.10 
2892 Explosives  0.10  
2893 Printing ink 0.19   
2895 Carbon black 0.10   
2899 Chemicals and chemical preparations, nec 0.29 1.17 0.68 
2911 Petroleum refining 0.48 1.17 0.58 
2992 Lubricating oils and greases 0.10  0.19 
2999 Products of petroleum and coal, nec  0.10 0.10 
3011 Tires and inner tubes 0.48 0.58 0.19 
3052 Rubber and plastics hose and belting  0.10 0.19 
3069 Fabricated rubber prod, nec 0.10   
3081 Unsupported plastics film and sheet 0.10  0.29 
3089 Plastics products, nec 0.10 0.29 0.29 
3111 Leather tanning and finishing   0.10 
3131 Boot and shoe cut stock and findings 0.10   
3143 Men's footwear, except athletic 0.29   
3144 Women's footwear, except athletic  0.10  
3161 Luggage 0.19  0.10 
3172 Personal leather goods, except women's purses 0.10 0.10 0.10 
3211 Flat glass 0.19  0.10 
3221 Glass containers 0.19 0.10 0.19 
3229 Pressed and blown glass and glasswear, nec 0.19 0.19 0.19 
3231 Glass products, made of purchased glass  0.10  
3241 Cement, hydraulic  0.29  
3253 Ceramic wall and floor tile   0.10 
3272 Concrete products, except block and brick   0.10 
3275 Gypsum products 0.19 0.10 0.19 
3291 Abrasive products 0.10 0.10  
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3292 Asbestos products  0.10  
3296 Mineral wool  0.10  
3312 Steel works, blast furnaces, and rolling mills 0.29 0.68 0.29 
3315 Steel wiredrawing and steel nails and spikes   0.10 
3316 Cold-rolled steel sheet, strip and bars 0.10   
3317 Steel pipe and tubes 0.19 0.29 0.29 
3325 Steel foundries, nec  0.10 0.19 
3334 Primary production of aluminum 0.77 0.10 0.10 
3341 Secondary nonferrous metals 0.10 0.10  
3351 Rolling, drawing, and extruding of copper 0.10 0.10 0.10 
3353 Aluminum sheet, plate, and foil    
3355 Aluminum rolling and drawing, nec  0.10  
3356 Rolling, drawing, & extruding of nonferrous metals 0.10   
3357 Drawing and insulating of nonferrous wire 0.48 0.49 0.68 
3365 Aluminum foundries  0.10 0.19 
3429 Hardware, nec 0.10   
3441 Fabricated structural metal 0.10  0.10 
3443 Fabricated plate work (boiler shops)   0.10 
3446 Architectural and ornamental metal work 0.10   
3449 Miscellaneous structural metal work  0.10  
3452 Bolts, nuts, screws, rivets, and washers 0.10   
3462 Iron and steel forgings   0.10 
3463 Nonferrous forgings  0.10 0.10 
3465 Automotive stampings  0.19  
3469 Metal stampings, nec 0.10   
3479 Coating, engraving, and allied services, nec   0.10 
3491 Industrial valves 0.10 0.10 0.10 
3493 Steel springs, except wire  0.10 0.10 
3498 Fabricated pipe and pipe fittings 0.19  0.10 
3499 Fabricated metal products, nec  0.19  
3511 Turbines and turbine generator sets  0.39 0.10 
3519 Internal combustion engines, nec 0.39 0.29 0.97 
3523 Farm machinery and equipment 0.68 0.10 0.19 
3531 Construction machinery and equipment 0.19 0.10 0.19 
3532 Mining machinery and equipment, except oil and gas 0.10  0.29 
3533 Oil and gas field machinery and equipment 0.87  0.10 
3535 Conveyors and conveying equipment 0.10   
3536 Hoists, cranes, monorail systems 0.10 0.10 0.10 
3537 Industrial trucks, tractors, trailers, & stackers 0.29 0.49 0.48 
3541 Machine tools, metal cutting types 0.19 0.10  
3542 Machine tools, metal forming types   0.10 
3548 Electric and gas welding and soldering equipment 0.10 0.10 0.10 
3555 Printing trades machinery  0.19  
3556 Food products machinery 0.10   
3559 Special industry machinery, nec 0.19 0.10 0.19 
3561 Pumps and pumping equipment 0.29  0.10 
3562 Ball and roller bearings 0.39 0.29 0.19 
3563 Air and gas compressors  0.10 0.19 
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3568 Mechanical power transmission equipment, nec 0.10   
3569 General industrial machinery and equipment 0.10 0.19 0.19 
3571 Electronic computers 1.74 1.46 0.58 
3572 Computer storage devices 0.29   
3575 Computer terminals 0.10 0.19  
3577 Computer peripheral equipment, nec 1.06 0.19 0.10 
3579 Office machines, nec 0.19   
3585 Refrigeration and heating equipment 0.48 0.39 0.19 
3589 Service industry machines, nec  0.19 0.10 
3592 Carburetors, pistons, piston rings, and valves  0.19 0.19 
3594 Fluid power pumps and motors 0.39   
3599 Machinery, except electrical  0.10  
3612 Power, distribution, and specialty transformers 1.25 0.29 0.10 
3613 Switchgear, switchboard equip  0.29 0.48 
3621 Motors and generators  0.29 0.19 
3624 Carbon and graphite products 0.19 0.19 0.29 
3629 Electrical industrial apparatus, nec 0.10  0.19 
3632 Household refrigerators and home and farm freezers  0.19 0.10 
3633 Household laundry equipment 0.10   
3639 Household appliances, nec  0.29  
3641 Electric lamp bulbs and tubes 0.10   
3644 Noncurrent-carrying wiring devices  0.10  
3647 Vehicular lighting equipment  0.10  
3651 Household audio and video equipment 0.19 0.49 0.10 
3652 Phonograph records, prerecorded audio tapes & disks 0.10 0.19 0.10 
3661 Telephone & telegraph apparatus 0.19 0.78 0.29 
3663 Radio & TV broadcasting & communications equipment 1.25 0.87 0.39 
3669 Communications equipment, nec 0.29 0.19 0.10 
3672 Printed circuit boards 0.39 0.10  
3674 Semiconductors and related devices 2.22 1.26 2.13 
3675 Electronic capacitors  0.10 0.10 
3679 Electronic components, nec 0.19 0.78 0.29 
3691 Storage batteries 0.48  0.19 
3692 Primary batteries, dry and wet 0.10 0.19 0.39 
3694 Electrical equip. for internal combustion engines   0.19 
3699 Electric equipment, nec  0.10  
3711 Motor vehicles and passenger car bodies 2.32 3.79 1.55 
3713 Truck and bus bodies  0.10  
3714 Motor vehicle parts and accessories 5.02 2.14 3.48 
3721 Aircraft 0.48 0.19 0.19 
3724 Aircraft engines and engine parts 0.58 0.19 0.39 
3728 Aircraft parts, equipment 0.10  0.10 
3731 Ship building and repairing  0.10 0.19 
3743 Railroad equipment 0.68 0.49 0.68 
3751 Motorcycles, bicycles, and parts  0.10 0.10 
3761 Guided missiles and space vehicles 0.29 0.10  
3764 Guided missile and space vehicle propulsion units 0.10   
3769 Guided missile and space vehicle parts, nec   0.10 
53 
Table 2.3 (continued) 
3812 Search, detection, and navigation equipment 0.29  0.39 
3822 Environmental controls 0.19   
3823 Process control instruments 0.19  0.10 
3825 Instruments to measure electricity 0.29  0.10 
3826 Laboratory analytical instruments 0.10   
3827 Optical instruments and lenses 0.29 0.19 0.10 
3829 Measuring & controlling devices 0.29 0.29 0.29 
3841 Surgical and medical instruments and apparatus 0.68 0.29 0.10 
3842 Orthopedic, prosthetic, and surgical supplies 0.10  0.19 
3843 Dental equipment and supplies  0.10 0.10 
3844 X-Ray apparatus & tubes & other irradiation equip. 0.10   
3845 Electromedical and electrotherapeutic apparatus 0.10 0.19 0.19 
3851 Ophthalmic goods  0.10  
3861 Photographic equipment and supplies 0.39 0.10 0.19 
3873 Watches, clocks, clockwork operated devices, parts 0.19 0.29 0.29 
3911 Jewelry, precious metal  0.29  
3914 Silverware, plated ware, and stainless steel ware  0.10  
3915 Jewelers' findings & materials, & lapidary work  0.10  
3931 Musical instruments  0.19 0.10 
3949 Sporting and athletic goods, nec 0.10  0.10 
3951 Pens, mechanical pencils, and parts 0.10  0.10 
3999 Manufacturing industries, nec   0.19 
4011 Railroads, line-haul operating 0.10   
4213 Trucking, except local  0.39 0.39 
4215 Courier services, except by air 0.10 0.19 0.10 
4225 General warehousing and storage   0.29 
4412 Deep sea foreign transportation of freight 0.19 0.29 0.29 
4424 Deep sea domestic transportation of freight 0.10   
4449 Water transportation of freight, nec   0.10 
4481 Deep sea transportation of passengers, exc. ferry 0.29 0.10 0.19 
4491 Marine cargo handling  0.19 0.39 
4512 Air transportation, scheduled 0.10 0.87 0.10 
4513 Air courier services 0.10   
4581 Airports and airport terminal services  0.19 0.48 
4724 Travel agencies 0.19 0.58 0.39 
4725 Tour operators 0.10 0.10 0.10 
4731 Arrangement of transportation of freight and cargo 0.29 0.19 0.39 
4741 Rental of railroad cars 0.10   
4812 Radiotelephone communications 0.48 0.58 0.87 
4813 Telephone communications, except radiotelephone 1.45 3.69 1.35 
4832 Radio broadcasting stations 0.10 0.49  
4833 Television broadcasting stations  0.68 0.19 
4841 Cable and other pay television services 0.39 0.29 0.58 
4899 Communications services, nec 0.68 0.19 0.68 
4911 Electric services 0.68 1.17 1.06 
4922 Natural gas transmission  0.39 0.10 
4923 Natural gas transmission and distribution  0.10  
4924 Natural gas distribution 0.10 0.19 0.10 
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4925 Gas production and/or distribution 0.10  0.10 
4931 Electric and other services combined 0.19   
4932 Gas and other services combined 0.19   
4941 Water supply 0.10   
4953 Refuse systems 0.29 0.19 0.19 
5012 Automobiles and other motor vehicles   0.19 
5013 Automotive parts, supplies 0.10 0.39 0.68 
5014 Tires and tubes   0.19 
5021 Furniture  0.10  
5045 Computers and peripheral equipment and software 0.10 0.19 0.19 
5046 Commercial equipment, nec   0.10 
5047 Medical, dental, and hospital equipment & supplies 0.19  0.29 
5049 Professional equipment and supplies, nec   0.10 
5051 Metals service centers and offices 0.10 0.78 0.19 
5063 Electrical apparatus and equip   0.10 
5064 Electrical appliances, television and radio sets  0.10  
5065 Electronic parts and equipment, nec 0.29  0.39 
5072 Hardware  0.10  
5075 Warm air heating and air-conditioning equipment   0.10 
5082 Construction & mining (except petroleum) machinery  0.29  
5084 Industrial machinery and equipment  0.19  
5085 Industrial supplies 0.19   
5087 Service establishment equipment and supplies  0.19 0.10 
5088 Transportation equipment, except motor vehicles   0.19 
5091 Sporting and recreational goods and supplies  0.10  
5093 Scrap and waste materials  0.19 0.19 
5094 Jewelry, watches, and precious stones and metals   0.10 
5099 Durable goods, nec 0.10 0.87 0.19 
5112 Stationery and office supplies 0.19  0.39 
5122 Drugs, drug proprietaries, and druggists' sundries   0.29 
5137 Women's and children's clothing and accessories   0.10 
5139 Footwear   0.10 
5147 Meats and meat products  0.10  
5148 Fresh fruits and vegetables 0.10 0.10  
5149 Groceries and related products, nec  0.10 0.19 
5171 Petroleum bulk stations and terminals 0.29   
5172 Petroleum and petroleum products wholesalers, nec  0.10 0.10 
5181 Beer and ale  0.10 0.10 
5182 Wine and distilled alcoholic beverages   0.10 
5193 Flowers, nursery stock, and florists' supplies   0.10 
5199 Nondurable goods, nec   0.10 
5311 Department stores  0.49 0.19 
5331 Variety stores 0.39  0.10 
5399 Miscellaneous general merchandise stores  0.10  
5411 Grocery stores  0.19  
5461 Retail bakeries 0.10   
5531 Auto and home supply stores   0.10 
5621 Women's clothing stores  0.10  
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5632 Women's accessory and specialty stores   0.10 
5661 Shoe stores 0.10  0.29 
5699 Miscellaneous apparel and accessory stores  0.10 0.10 
5712 Furniture stores  0.10 0.10 
5719 Miscellaneous home furnishings stores 0.10  0.10 
5731 Radio, television, and consumer electronics stores 0.10  0.10 
5734 Computer and computer software stores 0.10  0.29 
5735 Record and prerecorded tape stores  0.19 0.10 
5812 Eating places 0.19 0.49 0.87 
5813 Drinking places (alcoholic beverages) 0.48 0.19  
5942 Book stores   0.10 
5943 Stationery stores  0.10  
5944 Jewelry stores 0.10   
5947 Gift, novelty, and souvenir shops 0.10   
5961 Catalog and mail-order houses 0.58 0.49 0.29 
5999 Retail stores, nec  0.39 0.39 
6000 Banks  3.01 0.10 
6021 National commercial banks 1.45   
6022 State banks, member fed reserve 0.19 0.39  
6029 Commercial banks, nec  0.19  
6099 Functions related to depository banking, nec 0.19  0.39 
6141 Personal credit institutions 0.68 0.49 0.39 
6153 Short-term business credit institutions 0.10  0.29 
6159 Misc. business credit  0.39  
6162 Mortgage bankers and loan correspondents 0.39 0.10 0.48 
6211 Security brokers, dealers, and flotation companies 3.57 1.65 2.61 
6221 Commodity contracts brokers and dealers 0.48 0.10 0.10 
6231 Security and commodity exchanges 0.19 0.19 0.19 
6282 Investment advice 0.77 1.55 1.26 
6289 Security and commodity services, nec  0.10 0.19 
6311 Life insurance 1.25 0.58 0.97 
6321 Accidental and health insurance   0.19 
6324 Hospital and medical service plans 0.10   
6331 Fire, marine, and casualty insurance 0.87 0.10 0.29 
6351 Surety insurance  0.10  
6371 Pension, health, and welfare funds   0.10 
6411 Insurance agents, brokers, and service 0.19   
6512 Operators of nonresidential buildings 0.10 0.29 0.39 
6519 Lessors of real property, nec  0.10  
6531 Real estate agents and managers 0.48 0.29 0.48 
6552 Land subdividers and developers, except cemeteries  1.94 1.55 
6712 Offices of bank holding companies 0.10 0.19  
6719 Offices of holding companies, nec  0.49 0.10 
6722 Management investment offices, open-end  0.10 0.58 
6726 Investment offices, nec  0.10 0.48 
6794 Patent owners and lessors 0.10   
6798 Real estate investment trusts 2.12 0.58 0.97 
6799 Investors, nec 0.58 5.64 0.68 
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7011 Hotels and motels 1.25 0.58 1.26 
7299 Misc. personal services 0.10  0.10 
7311 Advertising agencies 0.10 0.58 0.10 
7319 Advertising, nec   0.19 
7323 Credit reporting services 0.10 0.10 0.10 
7331 Direct mail advertising services 0.19 0.10  
7334 Photocopying and duplicating services 0.10   
7336 Commercial art and graphic design 0.10   
7342 Disinfecting and pest control devices   0.10 
7349 Building cleaning and maintenance services, nec   0.10 
7359 Equipment rental and leasing, nec  0.10 0.10 
7361 Employment agencies 0.29 0.19 0.29 
7363 Help supply services 0.19   
7371 Computer programming services 0.77 0.68 0.77 
7372 Prepackaged Software 6.18 2.53 3.77 
7373 Computer integrated systems design 0.77 0.58 0.48 
7374 Data processing services 0.58 0.39 0.97 
7375 Information retrieval services 3.86 2.53 9.86 
7376 Computer facilities management services 0.19 0.58 0.58 
7377 Computer rental and leasing   0.10 
7378 Computer maintenance and repair  0.10  
7379 Computer related services, nec 0.39 0.29 0.48 
7381 Detective, guard, and armored car services  0.10  
7383 News syndicates  0.19  
7389 Business services, nec 1.06 0.68 1.35 
7513 Truck rental and leasing, without drivers  0.10  
7533 Automotive exhaust system repair shops  0.10  
7538 General automotive repair shops   0.10 
7629 Electrical and electronic repair shops, nec  0.10  
7692 Welding repair  0.10  
7699 Repair shops and related services, nec   0.10 
7812 Motion picture and video tape production 0.77 0.19 0.19 
7819 Services allied to motion picture production  0.10  
7822 Motion picture and video tape distribution 0.10  0.10 
7832 Motion picture theaters, except drive-in 0.10  0.19 
7941 Professional sports clubs and promoters  0.10  
7948 Racing, including track operation  0.10 0.10 
7993 Coin-operated amusement devices 0.10   
7996 Amusement parks 0.19   
7999 Amusement and recreation svcs 0.39   
8059 Nursing & personal care facils 0.10   
8062 General medical and surgical hospitals 0.10   
8092 Kidney dialysis centers 0.10 0.10 0.10 
8093 Specialty outpatient facilities, nec   0.10 
8099 Health and allied services, nec 0.19 0.10 0.10 
8221 Colleges, universities, and professional schools  0.49 0.10 
8243 Data processing schools  0.10 0.10 
8244 Business and secretarial schools  0.10  
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8299 Schools and educational services, nec 0.19 0.10 0.29 
8331 Job training vocational rehabilitation services   0.10 
8711 Engineering services 0.68 0.58 0.87 
8712 Architectural services  0.10  
8731 Commercial physical and biological research 0.58 0.68 2.22 
8732 Commercial nonphysical research 0.68 0.19 0.58 
8733 Noncommercial research organizations  0.19 0.10 
8734 Testing laboratories 0.10   
8741 Management services  0.10 0.29 
8742 Management consulting services 1.16 1.07 2.32 
8744 Facilities support management services 0.10   
8748 Business consulting services, nec 0.10 0.10 0.10 
9121 Legislative bodies  0.10  
9511 Air and water resource and solid waste management   0.10 
9611 Administration of general economic programs  0.10  
 
A standard event study method is used to measure the stock price response of 
US partners around IJV announcements. Abnormal performance for each US partner 
is estimated using the market model and daily stock returns from CRSP. The date of 
an IJV announcement from the SDC database is defined as day 0, and the estimation 
period for the market model estimate begins on day -170 and ends with day -21. The 
CRSP equally-weighted index is used as a proxy for market return. Abnormal returns 
for each firm are calculated as the difference between the actual return and an 
expected return generated by the market model; then abnormal returns are averaged 
across firms to obtain abnormal returns for each day over the event window [-10, 
+10]. I use three parametric and nonparametric tests to determine whether the 
abnormal return is significantly different from zero. The first test is a parametric Patell 
Z test. The second test is a nonparametric rank test described in Corrado (1989). I also 
use the nonparametric generalized sign test to test whether the fraction of positive 
returns on each event day is different from that in the estimation period. 
 
2.4.2 Empirical results 
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Table 2.4: Abnormal returns of US partners for IJV announcements, 1999-2008 
Abnormal returns (AR) and cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) are generated using 
the market model. For each firm, market model coefficients are estimated using daily 
returns and CRSP equally weighted market returns over the 150-day ([-170, -21]) 
estimation period. AR and CAR are tested for a statistically significant difference from 
zero using the two-tail parametric Patell Z test. A nonparametric rank test described in 
Corrado (1989) is used for testing the significance of the rank of the abnormal return. 
The nonparametric generalized sign test is used to test whether the fraction of positive 
returns is different form that in the estimation period. ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Event day or 
window 
AR or 
CAR 
(%) 
Z statistic Rank 
statistic 
Percent 
positive of 
AR or 
CAR 
-10 0.18 1.241   0.820 48.4 
-9 0.01 1.176    0.060      47.9 
-8 0.05 0.346      -0.830      49.0 
-7 0.05 -1.667*     -1.650      45.4 
-6 -0.07 -0.737      -0.640     48.4 
-5 -0.14 -0.951       -0.920      47.3 
-4 -0.03 0.030       -0.450      47.1 
-3 -0.10 -0.640        -2.160**     45.0 
-2 -0.17 -1.188        -1.580   45.6 
-1 -0.09 -1.517     -1.640     45.7 
0 1.06 7.545***   4.050***   53.1*** 
+1 -0.14 -0.373         -1.220      45.6 
+2 -0.22 -0.750    -1.290      46.5 
+3 0.04 0.082            0.060      47.9 
+4 -0.28 -3.110***        -2.700***   42.9*** 
+5 -0.24 -0.950       -1.590      45.0 
+6 0.10 1.091    0.060      48.2 
+7 -0.24 -2.092**       -2.600**   44.9 
+8 -0.07 -0.360       -0.840   44.8 
+9 0.23 1.883*  0.920      48.9 
+10 -0.08 0.743    -0.100      47.9 
[-1, 0] 0.97 4.263***   1.708* 51.0** 
[-1, +1] 0.82 3.265*** 0.688    49.3 
[-2, +2] 0.43 1.664* -0.753   50.8** 
[-2, +1] 0.65 2.234** -0.196    49.3 
 
Table 2.4 reports the abnormal returns of US partners for the whole sample of 
IJV announcements. The mean abnormal return on the announcement day 0 is 1.06%, 
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and it is significant at the 1% level according to all parametric and nonparametric 
tests. Many papers in the related literature evaluate the announcement effect by the 2-
day cumulative abnormal return (CAR) over the day [-1, 0].19 I also check the CAR [-
1, 0], which is 0.97% and statistically significant according to all tests. The results 
show that IJV investments are associated with a gain in shareholder value of US 
partners, on average. 
Following Doukas and Lang (2003), I classify IJV investments into two 
categories for US partners: focused IJVs and diversifying IJVs. If the primary four-
digit SIC code of the IJV is the same as the primary four-digit SIC code of the US 
partner, the investment is classified as a focused IJV.20 When the primary four-digit 
SIC code of the IJV is different from the primary four-digit SIC code of the US 
partner, the investment is classified as a diversifying IJV. In the sample, the number of 
focused IJVs is 325, while the number of diversifying IJVs is 717.21 This indicates that 
many US firms diversify outside their core businesses through IJV investments.    
Table 2.5 reports the abnormal returns of US partners for focused IJVs and 
diversifying IJVs. On the announcement day, day 0, the mean abnormal return for the 
focused IJVs is 0.90% and significant statistically, and the mean abnormal return for 
the diversifying IJVs is 1.13% and also statistically significant. The abnormal return 
on day -1 is -0.50 and statistically significant for the focused IJVs, but the day -1 
abnormal return for the diversifying IJVs is positive (0.09%) and not significant. The 
CAR [-1, 0] for focused IJVs is 0.40% and not significant, but the CAR [-1, 0] for 
diversifying IJVs is 1.22% and statistically significant. These results suggest that the  
                                                 
19
 This procedure considers the situation that the announcement is made during trading hours the 
previous day and reported with a one-day lag. 
20
 The SDC platinum provides the primary four-digit SIC code of joint ventures and joint venture 
partners. 
21
 In the sample of this study, 68.81% of IJV investments of US firms are associated with non-core-
related business. This is similar to the finding in Doukas and Lang (2003) that 64.09% of Greenfield 
FDI of US firms are associated with non-core-related business from 1980-1992.  
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Table 2.5: Abnormal returns for announcements of  
focused IJVs and diversifying IJVs 
 
Focused IJVs (N=325) Diversifying IJVs (N=717) 
Event day 
or 
window 
AR 
or 
CAR 
(%) 
Z statistic Rank 
statistic 
Percent 
positive 
of AR 
or CAR 
AR or 
CAR 
(%) 
Z statistic Rank 
statistic 
Percent 
positive 
of AR or 
CAR 
Differe
nce 
-10 0.09 0.196 0.100      48.1 0.22 1.312   0.860      48.4 -0.13 
-9 0.27 2.203**    1.350      51.8 -0.10 -0.084      -1.010      46.1 0.37 
-8 0.34 1.025     -0.620      48.8 -0.08 -0.331   -0.600      48.9 0.42 
-7 -0.27 -1.676* -0.420      47.0 0.19 -0.940    -1.740*     44.6 -0.46 
-6 -0.19 -1.510 -1.520      45.1 -0.02 0.072       0.340      49.8 -0.17 
-5 -0.12 -0.492     0.240      48.8 -0.15 -0.851     -1.350      46.6 0.03 
-4 0.20 1.127   0.080      47.0 -0.14 -0.740       -0.650      47.1 0.34 
-3 -0.21 -1.336   -0.600      47.3 -0.05 0.058      -2.230**     43.9* -0.16 
-2 -0.13 -0.228       -0.450      46.6 -0.19 -1.218         -1.520      45.3 0.06 
-1 -0.50 -2.571** -3.160***    59.5*** 0.09 -0.104    0.450      49.6 -0.59** 
0 0.90 4.144***   2.370**     52.6* 1.13 6.305*** 3.120*** 53.5*** -0.23 
+1 0.24 0.943       0.270      48.5 -0.31 -1.003      -1.630      44.4 0.55 
+2 -0.05 0.331     0.610      49.2 -0.30 -1.052      -1.970*     45.3 0.25 
+3 -0.06 -0.427   -0.100      48.1 0.09 0.406    0.180      47.9 -0.15 
+4 -0.06 -0.996     -0.700      44.7 -0.38 -3.081*** -2.750***    42.0*** 0.32 
+5 -0.43 -1.822*   -1.810*    38.8*** -0.15 0.041     -0.590      47.7 -0.28 
+6 -0.06 -0.176   0.150      48.5 0.17 1.428     -0.040     48.0 -0.23 
+7 -0.20 -0.951       -1.520      43.0 -0.25 -1.834*     -1.930*   45.8 0.05 
+8 0.01 0.345 0.880      49.4 -0.10 -0.668     -1.710*   42.7** 0.11 
+9 0.10 0.723     -0.120      47.3 0.28 1.769*        1.190      49.5 -0.18 
+10 -0.03 0.428    0.500      49.2 -0.11 0.595 -0.520      47.2 0.08 
[-1, 0] 0.40 1.112   -0.560      46.6 1.22 4.385*** 2.520**     53.1*** -0.82 
[-1, +1] 0.64 1.452     -0.304      49.2 0.91 3.001*** 1.119      49.4 -0.27 
[-2, +2] 0.46 1.171          -0.166 49.2 0.43 1.311        -0.695    51.6** 0.03 
[-2, +1] 0.51 1.144       -0.490     49.2 0.73 1.990**     0.210      49.4 -0.22 
 
gains of US shareholders from diversifying IJVs are greater than gains from focused 
IJVs, on average. This is in contrast to the finding in Doukas and Lang (2003) that 
non-core-related Greenfield FDI is harmful for US shareholders. It is also in contrast 
to the significant negative abnormal returns of US bidding firms announcing 
diversifying international acquisitions documented in Markides and Ittner (1994). 
Since the IJV investment studied in this paper, the Greenfield FDI analyzed in Doukas 
and Lang (2003), and international acquisitions studied in Markides and Ittner (1994) 
are three different modes of FDI, the conflicting results should not be surprising.  
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Furthermore, the conflicting results seem to suggest that the IJV investment may be a 
preferred mode when US firms invest outside of their core businesses and seek out 
diversification benefits abroad. The motive to seek out diversification benefits can also 
be supported by the fact that there is a greater number of US firms engaging in 
diversifying IJVs than that of focused IJVs in my sample.     
  Since the literature has shown the potential effect of partner business 
relatedness on the shareholder value of US partners who make IJV investments, I 
divide my sample further. Partner participation is also a unique feature in IJV 
investment. When firms engage in Greenfield FDI, they just invest in themselves. I 
classify focused IJV investments into two groups. If the foreign partner’s primary 
four-digit SIC code is the same as the primary four-digit SIC code of the US partner, 
investments are in the group of focused IJVs with related partners. If the foreign 
partner’s primary four-digit SIC code is different from the primary four-digit SIC code 
of the US partner, investments are in the group of focused IJVs with unrelated 
partners. Similarly, I divide diversifying IJV investments into two categories: 
diversifying IJVs with related partners and diversifying IJVs with unrelated partners. 
Table 2.6 reports the abnormal returns for focused IJVs with related partners 
and focused IJVs with unrelated partners. There are 124 IJVs in the sample of the 
former and 201 IJVs in the sample of the latter. This indicates that more US firms 
engage in focused IJVs with unrelated partners than with related partners in the 
sample. The abnormal return on day 0 for focused IJVs with related partners is 0.92%, 
and both the Z statistic and rank statistic are significant. The abnormal return on day 0 
for focused IJVs with unrelated partners is 0.89%. The Z statistic is significant while 
the rank statistic is not significant. The abnormal return on day -1 is -0.52% and 
significant according to all tests for focused IJVs with related partners, and the 
abnormal return on day -1 is -0.49% and also significant according to all tests for 
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focused IJVs with unrelated partners. The CAR [-1, 0] for both groups is 0.40% and 
not significant. The abnormal return pattern of these two subgroups of focused IJVs is 
consistent with the pattern of the whole sample of focused IJVs. There is not much 
difference between the abnormal return pattern of focused IJVs with related partners 
and focused IJVs with unrelated partners. When US firms expand their core businesses 
abroad, it seems that partner business relatedness does not play a role in the 
shareholder value of US partners. 
 
Table 2.6: Abnormal returns for announcements of focused IJVs with related 
partners and focused IJVs with unrelated partners 
 
Focused IJVs with related partners (N=124) Focused IJVs with unrelated partners (N=201) 
Event 
day or 
windo
w 
AR or 
CAR 
(%) 
Z 
statistic 
Rank 
statistic 
Percent 
positive 
of AR 
or CAR 
AR or 
CAR 
(%) 
Z statistic Rank 
statistic 
Percen
t 
positiv
e of 
AR or 
CAR 
Differen
ce 
-10 -0.01 -0.496    -0.150      50.0 0.15 0.653     0.260     46.9 -0.16 
-9 -0.25 0.407 0.070    48.1 0.61 2.505** 1.780* 54.3* -0.86 
-8 -0.21 0.262      -0.080      50.0 0.70 1.106   -0.770 48.1 -0.91 
-7 0.37 0.304           0.670      52.8 -0.69 -2.402**    -1.150    43.2 1.06** 
-6 -0.18 -0.984     -0.970      44.3 -0.19 -1.146 -1.240      45.6 0.01 
-5 -0.48 -1.440      -0.840      47.1 0.11 0.533        1.040      50.0 -0.59 
-4 0.97 2.107**      1.320     56.6* -0.30 -0.255 -1.020   40.7 1.27** 
-3 -0.54 -1.675* -0.680   47.1 0.00 -0.363    -0.230      47.5 -0.54 
-2 -0.21 -0.457 -0.810      47.1 -0.08 0.076   0.080     46.2 -0.13 
-1 -0.52 -1.998**    -2.240**    36.7** -0.49 -1.690*   -2.390**     37.6** -0.03 
0 0.92 2.947***   2.150**     54.7 0.89 2.945***    1.390      51.2 0.03 
+1 -0.08 -0.173   -0.160      45.2 0.45 1.352 0.500      50.6 -0.53 
+2 0.01 0.434   0.650      50.0 -0.09 0.075      0.280   48.7 0.10 
+3 -0.40 -1.052     -0.990   46.2 0.16 0.303   0.710      49.3 -0.56 
+4 0.07 -0.471     -0.170     49.0 -0.14 -0.900   -0.810      41.9 0.21 
+5 -0.45 -1.825* -2.110**    38.6* -0.42 -0.868 -0.670     38.8** -0.03 
+6 -0.20 -0.646     -0.110     47.1 0.03 0.297    0.300   49.3 -0.23 
+7 -0.22 0.310 -0.380     42.8 -0.19 -1.466 -1.740*     43.2 -0.03 
+8 -0.56 -2.514** -0.940      43.8 0.38 2.457**      1.980**   53.0 -0.94* 
+9 0.15 1.112     -0.200     44.7 0.07 0.032       0.010   49.0 0.08 
+10 0.45 1.710* 0.730      50.4 -0.34 -0.829   0.050    48.4 0.79 
[-1, 0] 0.40 0.671   -0.065   46.2 0.40 0.887    -0.706   46.9 0.00 
[-1, +1] 0.32 0.448 -0.147      46.2 0.85 1.505   -0.288   51.2 -0.53 
[-2, +2] 0.12 0.337    -0.188      48.1 0.68 1.234   -0.066     50.0 -0.56 
[-2, +1] 0.11 0.160     -0.534      47.1 0.78 1.342   -0.211 50.6 -0.67 
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Table 2.7: Abnormal returns for announcements of diversifying IJVs 
with related partners and diversifying IJVs with unrelated partners 
 
Diversifying IJVs with related partners 
(N=81) 
Diversifying IJVs with unrelated partners 
(N=636) 
Event 
day or 
window 
AR or 
CAR 
(%) 
Z 
statistic 
Rank 
statistic 
Percent 
positiv
e of 
AR or 
CAR 
AR 
or 
CAR 
(%) 
Z statistic Rank 
statistic 
Percent 
positive 
of AR 
or CAR 
Differe
nce 
-10 0.66 2.102**   1.340    51.4 0.16 0.633     0.430      48.1 0.50 
-9 -0.11 0.110 -0.320     42.8 -0.10 -0.130     -0.940     46.5 -0.01 
-8 0.27 0.506   1.070      55.7 -0.13 -0.536   -1.000      48.1 0.40 
-7 -0.44 -1.001      -0.660     44.2 0.28 -0.637 -1.590      44.6 -0.72* 
-6 -0.93 -1.254      -1.740*     42.8 0.10 0.532       0.970      50.7 -1.03** 
-5 -0.29 -0.983   -0.790    45.7 -0.13 -0.549      -1.130      46.7 -0.16 
-4 0.22 -0.358 -0.980      38.5 -0.18 -0.657         -0.330      48.2 0.40 
-3 0.44 1.058     -0.090     44.2 -0.12 -0.322     -2.290**     43.9* 0.56 
-2 -0.48 -1.408     -1.400      44.2 -0.15 -0.785      -1.090     45.4 -0.33 
-1 0.07 -0.132       -0.290      47.1 0.09 -0.062        0.570      50.0 -0.02 
0 0.85 1.771* 2.120**     64.2** 1.17 6.065*** 2.510**     52.0** -0.32 
+1 -0.65 -1.227       -1.150      42.8 -0.26 -0.622     -1.290      44.6 -0.39 
+2 -0.91 -2.219**   -2.500**     35.7* -0.21 -0.312    -1.180      46.6 -0.70 
+3 0.09 0.060    0.300      47.1 0.09 0.411          0.080      48.0 0.00 
+4 -0.37 -1.024      -1.440    37.1 -0.38 -2.906*** -2.370**     42.6** 0.01 
+5 -0.07 0.252    -0.740    45.7 -0.16 -0.048    -0.350      48.0 0.09 
+6 0.33 1.356     -0.050      47.1 0.15 1.026       -0.030      48.1 0.18 
+7 0.19 0.233    0.490 51.4 -0.31 -2.036**   -2.190**     45.1 0.50 
+8 -0.35 -0.480 -1.070      43.4 -0.07 -0.538        -1.410      42.6** -0.28 
+9 1.02 2.641***    2.380**     56.5 0.18 0.929        0.410     48.6 0.84* 
+10 -0.13 -1.057       -1.010      43.4 -0.11 1.015         -0.190      47.8 -0.02 
[-1, 0] 0.92 1.159   1.297      51.4 1.26 4.244***   2.173**    53.4*** -0.34 
[-1, +1] 0.27 0.238    0.396      48.5 1.00 3.107***    1.028      49.6 -0.73 
[-2, +2] -1.11 -1.438   -1.441    52.8 0.64 1.917* -0.217   51.5* -1.75 
[-2, +1] -0.20 -0.498 -0.359     42.8 0.85 2.298**  0.346      50.3 -1.05 
 
Table 2.7 provides the abnormal returns for diversifying IJVs with related 
partners and diversifying IJVs with unrelated partners. In the sample, 636 diversifying 
IJVs are formed with unrelated partners, while only 81 diversifying IJVs are formed 
with related partners. This indicates that when US firms engage in diversifying IJVs, 
they usually form partnerships with foreign partners whose core businesses are 
different from theirs. The abnormal return on day 0 is 0.85% and significant for 
diversifying IJVs with related partners. The abnormal return on day 0 is 1.17% and 
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significant for diversifying IJVs with unrelated partners. The CAR [-1, 0] for 
diversifying IJVs with related partners is 0.92%, but it is not significant. The CAR [-1, 
0] for diversifying IJVs with unrelated partners is 1.26%, and all test statistics are 
significant. Results indicate that diversifying IJVs with unrelated partners are expected 
to create more value for US partners than doing so with related partners, on average.  
For diversifying IJVs with unrelated partners, I divide them further into two 
groups according to the relationship of the core business of the foreign partner and the 
core business of the IJV. I name these two types of investments unilaterally 
diversifying IJVs with unrelated partners and bilaterally IJVs with unrelated partners. 
For unilaterally diversifying IJVs with unrelated partners, the primary four-digit SIC 
code of the IJV is the same as that of the foreign partner although it is different from 
that of the US partner. For bilaterally diversifying IJVs with unrelated partners, the 
primary four-digit SIC code of the IJV is not only different from that of the US partner 
but also different from that of the foreign partner.   
 Table 2.8 reports the abnormal returns for unilaterally diversifying IJVs with 
unrelated partners and bilaterally IJVs with unrelated partners. There are 162 
unilaterally diversifying IJVs with unrelated partners and 474 bilaterally IJVs with 
unrelated partners in the sample. The average abnormal return on day 0 is -0.03% and 
not significant for unilaterally diversifying IJVs with unrelated partners. For bilaterally 
IJVs with unrelated partners, the day 0 abnormal return is 1.56% and significant at the 
1% level. The CAR [-1, 0] is -0.03% and not significant for unilaterally diversifying 
IJVs with unrelated partners, while the CAR [-1, 0] is 1.68% and significant for 
bilaterally IJVs with unrelated partners. Results show that IJV investments are 
expected to create the highest value for US partners when all three entities (US 
partner, foreign partner, and IJV) are in different core businesses.  
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Table 2.8: Abnormal returns for announcements of unilaterally diversifying IJVs 
with unrelated partners and bilaterally IJVs with unrelated partners 
 
For unilaterally diversifying IJVs with unrelated partners, the core business of the IJV 
is different from the core business of the US partner, but is the same as the core 
business of the foreign partner. For bilaterally diversifying IJVs with unrelated 
partners, the core business of the IJV is different from the core business of both US 
and foreign partners. 
 
 
 
Unilaterally diversifying IJVs with unrelated 
partners (N=162) 
Bilaterally diversifying IJVs with unrelated 
partners 
(N=474) 
Event 
day or 
window AR or 
CAR 
(%) 
Z statistic Rank 
statistic 
Percen
t 
positiv
e of 
AR or 
CAR 
AR or 
CAR 
(%) 
Z statistic Rank 
statistic 
Percent 
positive 
of AR or 
CAR 
Differe
nce 
-10 -0.30 -0.171    -0.080      48.0 0.31 0.824   0.540    48.1 -0.61 
-9 -0.08 0.511   -0.360     46.5 -0.11 -0.438 -0.860      46.6 0.03 
-8 -0.11 0.234     -0.760      45.7 -0.14 -0.748     -0.700      48.8 0.03 
-7 0.75 0.823    0.120     48.0 0.13 -1.197     -1.880*     43.6 0.62 
-6 0.06 1.194     0.710     48.0 0.11 -0.064    0.690      51.6* -0.05 
-5 0.09 0.303   0.010    47.2 -0.20 -0.802       -1.290 46.6 0.29 
-4 0.28 0.341      0.040     48.0 -0.33 -0.947     -0.400      48.3 0.61** 
-3 -0.30 -1.052     -2.120**     42.6 -0.06 0.225      -1.380    44.3 -0.24 
-2 -0.01 -0.408    -0.400    45.7 -0.19 -0.672      -1.010      45.3 0.18 
-1 0.00 0.124        0.670     55.0 0.12 -0.142     0.250      48.3 -0.12 
0 -0.03 0.075       -0.670      44.9 1.56 6.925***   3.240***   54.3*** -1.59 
+1 -0.21 -0.902    -0.560    45.7 -0.28 -0.204       -1.150    44.3 0.07 
+2 -0.09 0.686      0.290      49.6 -0.25 -0.748    -1.510    45.7 0.16 
+3 0.20 0.078           -0.190      47.2 0.06 0.428    0.210    48.2 0.14 
+4 -0.49 -2.897*** -1.040     41.8 -0.35 -1.699* -2.100**     42.9* -0.14 
+5 0.10 0.594    -0.190     47.2 -0.25 -0.391 -0.290      48.2 0.35 
+6 0.72 3.481***   1.510   55.0 -0.03 -0.794    -0.910     45.9 0.75* 
+7 -0.54 -3.063***   -2.610***   39.5** -0.23 -0.603    -0.980   46.9 -0.31 
+8 0.13 1.137 0.180    48.0 -0.14 -1.267       -1.710*     40.9*** 0.27 
+9 0.92 2.977*** 1.740*     56.2* -0.05 -0.616     -0.540      46.2 0.97* 
+10 -0.52 -0.938   -0.960      45.3 0.03 1.698* 0.340      48.6 -0.55 
[-1, 0] -0.03 0.141           0.004      48.0 1.68 4.797*** 2.473**     55.1*** -1.71* 
[-1, +1] -0.25 -0.406       -0.320      44.1 1.40 3.799***    1.357   51.3 -1.65 
[-2, +2] -0.35 -0.190     -0.297      51.9 0.95 2.310**    -0.075      51.3 -1.30 
[-2, +1] -0.25 -0.555 -0.478      45.7 1.21 2.954***    0.671      51.8* -1.46 
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2.5 Summary and Conclusions 
This is the first paper that systematically studies the effect of industrial 
diversification and partner business relatedness on shareholder value of US firms that 
engage in IJV investments abroad. Results show that, on average, investing abroad 
through IJVs is beneficial for US partners. IJVs invested outside of the core businesses 
of both US and foreign partners and formed by partners with different core businesses 
are the most value-increasing for US shareholders. The mechanism of value creation 
from industry diversification and partner unrelatedness in the context of IJV 
investments is open to future research.  
Previous literature provides dominant evidence that the industrial 
diversification is associated with a “discount” in the shareholder value for Greenfield 
FDI and international acquisition, therefore the “premium” from diversifying IJV 
investments documented in this paper may also suggest that the international joint 
venture should be a preferred mode for US firms when they develop their non-core 
businesses overseas.    
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